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1     Introduction    
1.1   Background of the Study 
Civil society is the totality of voluntary civic and social organizations that constitute the 
basis of a functioning society different from the state, the market and the family.1 Civil 
society has been thriving in different forms and for diversified functions for long period. 
Gradually, its influence in society has grown large thereby competing, challenging and 
supplanting governments including in areas and services used to be government functions.2
   
  
In Ethiopia, civil society in its present form is a recent phenomenon though traditional and 
religious associations existed for long time. The sector has been largely limited to relief 
operations. It however underwent important transformation since the relative liberalization 
in the 1990s.3 The incorporation of civil and political rights in the country’s 1995 
Constitution and the ratification of important human rights instruments paved the way for 
the development. Article 31 of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia (FDRE) recognized the freedom of association while article 9 made international 
human rights instruments part of the law of the land. As a result, the voluntary sector 
mushroomed including international NGOs and transformed its intervention areas to 
development and rights advocacy.4 According to Ad-hoc CSO/NGO Task Force study, 
from about few hundred registered CSOs in 1990s it reached 2,305 by 2007 at the federal 
level alone.5
                                                 
1 Davi (2006) p.5 
 The growth of local CSOs was fast accounting 75% of CSOs. It also evolved 
and strengthened in membership and income, internal organization, network and role in the 
overall development of the nation. Between 2004 and 2008, the total NGO transfers 
amounted to around 2 billion USD, the annual breakdown greater than earnings from, 
coffee-first export item, allowing them to allocate huge budget for sustainable development 
2 Dekker (2005) p.256. 
3 Civil Societies at the Cross Roads: Prospects and Challenges in Ethiopia (2008) p. vii.   
4 Ibid. 
5 Rahmato, Bantirgu and Endeshaw (2008) p.5.  See same for the contribution of CSOs in the country. 
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activities.6 The transfers increased after the 2005 national election where donors choose to 
channel assistance through NGOs than through direct government aid.7 In addition, the 
partnership with international NGOs and Agencies boasted their human capability to 
engage actively in human rights promotion and policy advocacy programs.8
 
  
Nonetheless, CSOs have had little role to influence the promotion and protection of human 
rights and the democratization process in the country.9 But this was about to change. The 
ever-open and promising political atmosphere in the 2005 national election enabled CSOs 
to unleash its potential: CSOs were active in voters’ education, arranging political debates, 
election observation and representation of candidates before court of law.10 Regrettably, 
the active role CSOs played during this period has not gone well with the Government and 
seems to cause a series of setback measures.11 Besides the initial ban of CSOs coalitions to 
observe the election, prominent CSOs leaders were jailed after the election.12 The largest 
CSOs umbrella organization, CRDA was told to redefine its objectives to get its license 
renewed, and Ethiopian Lawyers Association was dismissed as having no legal existence.13
 
 
Soon after the draft Charities and Societies Proclamation was introduced and enacted in to 
law, the Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSP or Proclamation No. 621/2009). 
The law caused a flare of criticism from CSOs and international community as being 
contradictory to the country’s human rights commitments.14  Some argue that the CSP law 
is a culmination of the unhealthy moves by the government towards independent CSOs. 
The Government does not consider CSOs/NGOs as partner or helpful in the development 
process of the country.15
                                                 
6 Ibid.  
 Said to be modeled after Singapore’s Societies law, the law puts a 
7 Carmody (2007) p.148 
8 Rahmato, Bantirgu and Endeshaw (2008) p.5. 
9 Milkias (2006). For the development of civil society in the country  see  Assefa and Zewde (eds.) (2008)   
10 Teshome (2009) p. 80.   
11 The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, Ethiopia: Human Rights Defenders under     
   Pressure (2005) p.2. 
12 US State Department 2008 Country Report on Human Rights Practices – Ethiopia, (26 Feb 2009). 
13 Aalen and Trovoll (2009) pp.17-18. 
14 US Department of State, 2009 Human Rights Reports: Ethiopia (March 11, 2010).  HRW’s Analysis of  
    Ethiopian Draft Civil Society Law (2008). Amnesty International’s Comments on Ethiopian Charities and  
    Societies Proclamation (2008). Amnesty International: Ethiopia, Submission to the UN Universal Periodic  
    Review (13 April 2009) p.3 
15 In a debate on civil society in 2004 a government official declared that CSOs/NGOS have no or little     
    contribution for development.  
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number of measures to control the activities of CSOs in the country. Some of the measures 
seem to restrict individuals’ rights to freely form and participate in civil society 
organizations and actively participate in the socio-economic and political process of the 
country.  
 
In this research, I will try to show the major pitfalls of the Charities and Societies law that 
contravenes international and national human rights instruments that guarantee freedom of 
association and other basic freedoms that are basis for individuals to associate and pursue a 
shared goal by forming civil society organizations.  
1.2   Statement of the Problem  
With the enactment of the Charities and Societies law the relative developments in the 
voluntary sector seems to have met a nip-in-the-bud as it effectively bars the majority of 
local and international CSOs from engagement in human rights promotion, sustainable 
development advocacy and strengthening of democracy.16
 
 The law not only puts activism 
and mobilization beyond the reach of CSOs but also threatens the very existence of CSOs 
in the country by controlling and limiting their income source. It also makes functioning of 
an independent civil CSO a far cry. 
One of the main criteria the Charities and Societies Law uses to prohibit CSOs to promote 
human rights, democracy and peace is the amount of money obtained from abroad by 
CSOs to run their activities.17
 
 If they receive more than ten percent of their income from 
abroad, CSOs cannot participate in the above activities and are not recognized as Ethiopian 
CSO rather as ‘‘Ethiopian residents’’ or ‘‘foreign’’ CSOs.  
In addition, to continue work, CSOs must undergo an arduous procedure of re-registration 
by fulfilling the hefty requirements of the law. It is now a fact that hundreds of civil society 
organizations were unable to re-register. Even those civil society organizations that 
manage to get license will be subjected to continuous and intrusive control mechanisms 
violation of which entails serious penalty on personnel and severe consequences on the 
association including extra-judicial dissolution without being able to appeal to a court. 
                                                 
16 Proclamation No. 621/2009 arts. 2 and 14(5). 
17 Ibid. 
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These and many other measures under the law beg the question of compatibility with 
human rights standards. In this thesis attempt will be made to address this issue and the 
following particular questions: 
 
1) Whether the CSP conforms to the fundamental freedom of association as enshrined 
in the Constitution and human rights instruments? 
2) How does CSP affect civil society in the country in general, and human rights 
organizations in particular?   
3) How does the CSP affect promotion of human rights and the democratization 
process in the country? 
1.3   Objective and Scope of the Study    
To this writer’s knowledge, there is not a single legislation that attracted so much attention 
and has as many as four drafts than CSP. Obviously, this is not because of the vibrancy of 
the legislative organ but because of the high stake involved and the pressure ‘‘from above 
and below’’ on the government to adopt less restrictive legislation. In many ways, the law, 
many believe, represents regression to authoritarianism.18
 
 For a citizen and human rights 
student it is motivating enough to examine such a law with massive consequences.  
The study will thus have the following main objectives: analyzing the provisions and 
implications of the law in light of human rights principles and standards, and discern the 
below par standards adopted in the CSP and the threat it poses to the fundamental freedom 
of association, CSOs, human rights work and the democratization process in the country. 
Detailed discussion on the concept of civil society or of Ethiopian civil society is thus out 
of the scope of the research. 
 
To achieve the objectives, the study is divided in to six chapters. The introductory chapter 
provides a brief background to the study, its objective, statement of the problem and 
methodology to be used.  The second chapter provides a brief overview of the foundation 
of civil society with a focus on the fundamental freedoms necessary for their operation. 
Civil society as a concept, its raison d’être and function in society and its relation with 
                                                 
18 Aalen and Tronvol (2009).    
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state are also touched upon in the same chapter. By dealing with the social and legal 
foundations of civil society, the foundation for the latter chapters is intended to be laid in 
here. The third chapter deals with the operating environment for civil society in Ethiopia. 
Legal frameworks as well as political and ideological issues that may possibly explain 
legislative measures are dealt in here.  The fourth and fifth chapters exclusively deal with 
the CSP. Analysis of the main limitations of the law vis-à-vis human rights standards is 
made in chapter four while its possible implications on CSOs, human rights promotion and 
the democratization process in the country are dealt in chapter five. Finally, in chapter six, 
concluding remarks are drawn from the findings of the study. 
1.4   Methodology 
The research is intended to be carried out mainly from a legal and political science 
perspectives. Both primary and secondary sources will be used in the study. Treaties, 
domestic laws, cases and interviews will be consulted as primary source materials. Books, 
journals, articles and other sources will be consulted as secondary materials. Moreover, 
experiences of other counties will also be resorted to whenever necessary.  
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2   The Foundation of Civil Society: An Overview 
2.1   Concept and Definition   
The concept of civil society is an age-old one and so is the debate on its boundary, function 
and meaning. For classical and medieval thinkers, civil society was synonymous with the 
state refereeing social conflict by applying rules that restrained individuals from harming 
each other.19 In this sense, the state represented ‘‘civil’’ form of society and ‘‘civility’’ 
described the requirements of ‘‘good citizenship’’.20 This line of thinking took shape in the 
face of social disorder that needed a benign force, civilized state, as a solution. For 
Enlightenment thinkers, who witnessed abusive power of the state, civil society was 
considered as separate from and ‘‘a defense against unwarranted intrusion by the state on 
newly realized individual rights and freedoms, organized through the medium of voluntary 
associations’’.21 This theme was taken up by modern thinkers and is alive and kicking. It 
particularly gained prominence following the fall of socialism and the subsequent rush for 
democratization and institutionalization of public participation and inflow of western aid to 
newly independent states and developing countries.22
 
  
The debate on civil society continues perhaps more vigorously. And, although, as Edwards 
notes, it is impossible to reach consensus on of civil society debate,23
 
 to see some 
definitions and defining elements of the concept serves clarity.  
Realizing the danger posed to citizens by the powerful and encroaching modern state and 
relentless capitalism, Habermas envisage that: 
 
                                                 
19 Edwards (2009) p.6. 
20 Kaldor (2003) p. 17. 
21 Edwards (2009) p.7. 
22 Ibid, p. 7-17. 
23 Ibid, p. 5. 
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 … [civil society’s] institutional core comprises those non-governmental and non-
economic connections and voluntary associations that anchor the communication 
structures of the public sphere in the society component of the life-world. Civil 
society is composed of those more or less spontaneously emergent associations, 
organistions, and movements that, attuned to how social problems resonate in 
private life spheres, distil and transmit such reactions to the public sphere. The 
core of civil society comprises a network of associations that institutionalizes 
problem solving discourses of general interest inside the framework of organized 
public spheres.24
 
 
Accordingly, civil society is viewed as an answer to common, societal problems caused by 
the modern state and capitalism where individuals act independently and collectively to 
solve it democratically.  
 
In a stark contrast, Kaldor, following the neoliberal line of thought defines civil society as 
‘‘the realm between the state, the market and the family, it is a realm of stability rather 
than struggle, of service provision rather than advocacy, of trust and responsibility rather 
than emancipation’’.25 Here civil society is viewed as more passive, less as a check on the 
state and the market and more as a complement to or even as a substitute for the state and 
the market.26
 
 
Skocpol and Fiorina defines civil society as ‘‘the network of ties and groups through which 
people connect to one another and get drawn in to community and political affairs’’.27 This 
is a broad definition that includes not only the formal groups that constitute the bulk of 
civil society but also informal ones through which people link and tie themselves ranging 
from social movements to various ‘‘publics’’ that engage in debates in the public sphere.28
 
 
It also emphasizes on the activism and advocacy role of civil society. 
                                                 
24 Habremas, quoted in Kaldor (2003), pp. 21-22. 
25 Kaldor (2003) p.22. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Skocpol and Fiorina (1999) p. 2. 
28 Armony (2004) p. 11.  
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The difference on the different definition of civil society seems to stem from the emphasis 
on the different elements and functions of civil society. The characteristic elements that 
define civil society are voluntariness, public benefit and separate identity. Voluntariness is 
a hallmark of civil society that differentiates it from force-backed institutions of the state 
and the family.29 Scholars who emphasizes on voluntariness consider all voluntarily 
formed associations including political and commercial associations as civil society. 
Others argue that civil society is further defined by its purpose, public benefit. It purports 
to benefit the public instead of garnering economic benefit or political power for itself and 
protects the helpless from the powerful and brutal forces of the state and the market 
through activism and organizing.30 Accordingly, associations-for-profit and political 
associations that vie for wielding the ‘‘right to exercise control over public power and the 
state apparatus’’ are excluded from civil society domain.31 Finally, civil society is located 
in the ‘‘public sphere’’, i.e., it is beyond the realm of individual conduct and family 
concerns of the domestic sphere. It refers to the places where citizens argue about the great 
questions of the day and negotiate on the ‘common’ or ‘public’ interest.32
 
 
According to William and RoBteutscher, civil society is positioned ‘‘in a sphere that is 
equally detached form: the private concerns of autonomous individuals; the public sphere 
of political decision making and administrative action; and the forces of markets and labor 
relations.’’33
 
 It is thus the ‘‘third sector’’ in the ‘‘tripartism’’ of the state and the market. 
However, the boundary between them is not always clear. London School of Economics 
Center for Civil Society working definition, which I found most appropriate, states: 
Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared 
interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from 
those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between 
state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. 
Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional 
forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies 
                                                 
29 Dekker (2005) p.255. 
30 Social Capital and Associations in European Democracies: A Comparative Analysis (2007) p.57. 
31 Linz and Stefan (1996) p.8. 
32 Edwards (2005).  
33 Social Capital and Associations in European Democracies: A Comparative Perspective (2007) p. 55. 
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are often populated by organisations such as registered charities, development 
non-governmental organisations, community groups, women's organisations, 
faith-based organisations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help 
groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy 
group.34
2.2   Raison d’être and Function  
 
Civil society is a dynamic notion constantly mutating and adapting to new realities, 
challenges and opportunities.35 As we have seen above, it encompasses diversified entities 
created over time to address specific concerns in society. The nature and form they 
manifest differ significantly from society to society due to different socio-economic, 
political and legal realities. The common denominator however is that they are established 
and continue to exist due to ‘‘pressing social needs’’ and ‘‘dysfunction of the state.’’36
 
  
Historically, civil society served to maintain order in society and to defend rights and 
freedoms form abusive state intervention. The later function of civil society is still alive in 
modern times. Civil society as an organ of society adopts its cause for justice, equality and 
freedom and advocate for change. This function has been exemplified recently in the Anti-
Apartheid struggle in South Africa, and ‘‘color revolutions’’ in Central and Eastern 
European countries.37 Citizens’ exercise of their rights and activism through their civic 
associations served as bulwark against totalitarianism and transformed the nations to 
democracy, contributing to the renewed interest in civil society and their role in 
democratization.38 Moreover, civil society plays an important role in fostering pluralism, 
advocating change, and criticizing the state when it does wrong. Human rights and 
advocacy CSOs in particular play an important role in this respect. They serve as 
whistleblowers and bring out the facts, contribute to the protection, promotion and 
enforcement of human rights norms.39
 
  
 
                                                 
34 London School of Economics Center for Civil Society, (2004).         
35 Salole (2008) p. 14. 
36 The State and NGOs (2002) p. 2. 
37 Forbrig and Demes (2007) pp.9-16. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Steiner and Alston (2000) p. 938. 
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At social and economic level, the inability of people to lead a fulfilling life, for being left 
out both from the market and the state, forced society to respond, i.e., to provide vital 
social services through citizens’ initiatives and civic associations.40 Lack of means for life 
and exclusion is dire in developing countries due to lack of capacity or will on the part of 
the state to provide services for people unable to obtain resources by themselves. Civil 
society organizations try to fill this vacuum, and in the mean time, they become substantial 
contributors of development. They raise huge recourses which governments would not be 
able to do so.41
 
 Thus,  the need to address pressing societal needs which the state and the 
market would not always be able to do has remained one of the main raison d’être for the 
formation and continued existence of civil society in the modern times.  
In general, the nature and function of CSOs in society is diverse depending on the realities 
of life and societal needs, which remains to be the factor for the establishment and 
existence of civil society. Civil society organizations are not thus luxuries but necessities in 
society to address its problems, shape its future through citizen participation. 
2.3   Relationship with the State 
The relationship between the state and CSOs has generally been uneasy. Many states 
consider the existence of (independent) CSOs as a threat and hence have no positive 
attitude towards their activities.42 Various reasons contribute to the tense relationship. The 
first is the overlapping of function between the state and CSOs. As we have seen above, 
CSOs compete with the state in service delivery and influence over the public. Second, 
CSOs give citizens the opportunity to organize and act together giving them power and 
influence43
 
, which is not liked particularly by non-democratic governments.  
In western democracies, the attitude towards CSOs is generally positive though there are 
marked differences in the nature of the relationship.44
                                                 
40 The State and NGOs (2002) p.2. 
 In the Scandinavian social welfare 
democracies where the state provides extensive welfare services and respects human rights, 
the relation is smooth and complimentary; CSOs principally playing the role of pulling the 
41 Rahmato (2008).  
42 Freedom of Association in China and Europe (2005) p.13. 
43 Armony (2004) p.xii. 
44 Salole (2008) p.11. 
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government to fill gaps. In Anglo-Saxon democracies CSOs serve as a ‘‘counterweight’’ to 
the state, critical of it and advocate for change but still healthy relationship.  
 
By contrast, in developing countries where governments are often totalitarian and 
inhospitable to political pluralism and dissent the relationship with CSOs is tense.45 CSOs 
are considered as opponents and governments try to control and silence them. CSOs Laws 
have been used as an instrument to control the sector.46
2.4   Legal Foundation: Basic Freedoms for the Operation of CSOs  
  
Besides the social foundation, the question of the legal basis of civil society is perhaps the 
crucial one. It has been argued by many, including Martin Scheinin, that the legal 
foundation of civil society is embedded in the core civil and political rights of the freedom 
of association, assembly and expression.47
2.4.1   Freedom of Association     
 These freedom rights, which are recognized in 
human rights instruments and national laws, enable persons to organize around certain 
interests (form associations) and participate in them. Among them, freedom of association 
is the most essential in relation to CSOs. It would however be futile without freedom of 
assembly and expression. Although freedom of association is an individual right it can only 
be meaningfully exercised in association with others. Assemblage and expression are thus 
essential rights for the effective exercise of freedom of association and hence for the 
formation and functioning of associations (CSOs).  
Freedom of association refers to ‘‘the right of individuals to interact and organize among 
themselves to collectively express, promote, pursue and defend common interests.’’48 It is 
a ‘‘core’’ or ‘‘basic personal liberty’’ which is an extension of the liberty of conscience.49
 
 
Tocqueville maintains:  
                                                 
45 The State and NGOs (2002) p.4. 
46 Global Trends in NGO Law, International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, vol.1, iss. 1 (2009) ( herein after  
    Global Trends in NGO Law). Freedom of Association in China and Europe (2005). The State and NGOs  
    2002). 
37 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Common Standard of Achievement (1999) p.417. 
48 Jilani (2004) para.12.    
49 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Common Standard of Achievement (1999) p.417.    
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The most natural privilege of man, next to the right of acting himself, is that 
of combining his exertions with those of his fellow creatures and of acting in 
common with them. The right of association therefore appears to me almost 
as inalienable in its nature as the right of personal liberty. No legislator can 
attack it without impairing the foundation of society.50
 
 
Freedom of association is recognized as a fundamental freedom in international and 
regional human rights instruments.51
 
 Article 22 (1) of the ICCPR states: ‘‘[e]veryone shall 
have the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join 
trade unions for the protection of his interest.’’  
Freedom of association has an individual and collective dimension. The individual 
dimension of freedom of association refers to the ‘‘subjective right of the individual to 
found an association with those like-minded or to join an existing association.’’52 The right 
to form or join an association is an inherent element of freedom of association ‘‘without 
which freedom of association would be deprived of any meaning’’.53
 
 It allows individuals 
to establish or join various types of associations: religious, political, economic, social, 
cultural, sports, commercial, etc to act collectively in the field of mutual interest.  As far as 
it is lawful there is no limitation regarding the purpose for which an association can be 
established.  
The question of whether the protection of freedom of association includes from being 
forced to join an association or withdraw at will (negative freedom of association) is not 
explicitly settled in the ICCPR and the ECHR. However, the ECtHR has established 
jurisprudence in this regard. The decisions in Young, James and Webster v.UK, Sigurdur A. 
Sigurjonsson v. Iceland, Chassagnou and others v. France affirm that freedom of 
association includes protection from compulsory membership as well.54
                                                 
50 Tocqueville quoted in Brody (2002) p. 823.  
 It is maintained 
that the notion of association presupposes a voluntary grouping for a common goal. There 
51 UDHR art 20, ICCPR art 22, ACHPR art 10, ECHR art. 11.  
52 Nowak (1993) p.385. 
53 Sidropoulos and others v. Greece, para. 40.  
54 Young, James and Webster v.UK,  para.52.   Sigurdur A. Sigurjonsson v. Iceland, para. 35. Chassagnou  
   and others v. France, Para. 103. 
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is thus the element of choice every individual makes with whom to associate or not. 
Compulsory membership is a violation of freedom of conscience/choice and hence of 
freedom of association.55
 
  
Although the ECtHR jurisprudence have no precedence outside of Europe, one can put 
strong argument for a similar interpretation of Article 22 given the language in the ICCPR 
is virtually identical with the ECHR. Moreover, Article 20(2) of the UDHR and Article 
10(2) of the ACHPR affirm that ‘‘no one may be compelled’’ to join an association.  
 
The collective dimension of freedom of association refers to ‘‘the right of an existing 
association to perform activities in pursuit of the common interest of its members.’’56 
Although the provisions seem to be framed in a way protecting only natural persons, 
freedom of association also has implicit collective dimension, meaning the protection of 
freedom of association also extends to associations themselves.57 It protects the right to 
carry out freely activities for which the association is established. Anne David calls this 
aspect of freedom of association as ‘‘freedoms of associations’’.58 Unlike earlier times 
where only natural persons were entitled to have freedoms, now associations also enjoy 
their own freedom. They have an identity separate from the creators and have their own 
rights and responsibilities. They are thus persons under the eyes of the law, albeit a 
fictitious or judicial one (legal personality). According to Alkema ‘‘the association itself is 
protected in its rights to carry out its activity through the rights granted to its members’’.59 
Moreover, associations do not need to assume legal personality; de facto associations are 
equally protected, though some kind of institutional structure is required, even within de 
facto associations.60
 
  
The freedom of associations mainly pertains to the organizational and operational 
independence to carry out the function they are established for. Associations should have 
the independence for self-administration and operation. Among others, access to funds is 
                                                 
55 Young, James and Webster v.UK, para.52, and  Chassagnou  and others v. France, Para. 103. 
56 Nowak (1993) p. 385. 
57 Sekaggya (2009) para. 21. 
58 David (1994) p. 88. 
59 Alkema (1994) p.76. 
60 Sekaggya (2009) para. 21. 
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crucial for associations to operate and implement their objectives. The UN Special 
Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders maintains that access to funding ‘‘is an inherent 
element of freedom of association’’.61
 
 Lack of it denies operational independence and 
cripples the association itself and the freedom of association. 
The Declaration on Human Rights Defenders explicitly recognizes the right of 
associations, human rights defenders in particular, to have access to funding. Article 13 
provides: ‘‘[e]veryone has the right, individually and in association with others, to solicit, 
receive and utilize resources for the express purpose of promoting and protecting human 
rights and fundamental freedoms through peaceful means….’’ 
 
Interference in organizational and operational independence of associations denies 
meaningful exercise and enjoyment of the freedom of association. In Belyatsky et al case, 
the Human Rights Committee (HRC) affirms that: ‘‘… the right to freedom of association 
relates not only to the right to form an association but also guarantees the right of such an 
association freely to carry out its statutory activities.…The protection afforded by article 
22 extends to all activities of an association….’’62 [Emphasis added.] The ECtHR reached 
a similar conclusion in the Turkish Communist Party case that the freedom of association 
would be largely theoretical and illusory if it were limited to the founding of an 
association, since the government could immediately disband it, and that ‘‘the protection 
afforded by freedom of association lasts for an association's entire life’’.63
 
 
Although membership is an important concept in relation to freedom of association, the 
issue of disclosure of membership in an association seems mute in international 
instruments dealing with freedom of association. It is nonetheless topical due to anti-
terrorism laws. The US Supreme Court held as early as 1959 in NAACP v. Alabama64
                                                 
61 Sekaggy (2009) para. 91. 
 that 
governments may not adopt policies which are designed overtly or covertly to discourage 
citizens from joining groups which the government may believe to be undesirable. It ruled 
that the governments’ desire to hinder formation and assemblage of groups which it deems 
62 Aleksander Belyatsky and others. v. Belarus,  Para. 7.2. 
63 United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, para. 33. 
64 Solter (1958-1959) pp. 654-55. 
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unsuitable is a violation of freedom of association. The ruling stemmed when the state of 
Alabama attempted to force NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People) to reveal the names and addresses of all its members in the state. 
 
Disclosure of membership in an association is related to the protected right to privacy.65
 
 
Article 11(2) of the Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the European 
Parliament (1989) states that: ‘‘No one shall in their private life be required to disclose 
their membership of any association which is not illegal.’’  
Freedom of association has a mixed feature. It has a feature of political rights66 making it 
indispensible for the existence of a functioning democracy as political interests can be 
effectively promoted collectively. But it also has a characteristic of civil rights sanctioning 
the state and private parties from arbitrary interference with individuals’ right of 
association. 67
 
   
To summarize, freedom of association is one of the fundamental freedoms and legal basis 
for the establishment and running of all forms of associations including civil society 
organizations. It protects the independent formation and functioning of civil society 
organizations. 
2.4.2   Freedom of Assembly 
Freedom of assembly is the right to gather without fear of state repression or intrusion. It 
protects the right to prepare, conduct and participate in an assembly, and ‘‘the discussion 
or proclamation of information and ideas’’.68 Freedom of assembly is recognized in 
international and regional instruments.69
 
  
Freedom of assembly is inextricably linked to the freedom of association to the extent that 
instruments like the UDHR treat them in a single provision. It entitles members of 
associations to hold assemblies for various reasons including protest, expression of views 
                                                 
65 UDHR art. 12 , ICCPR art. 17 , ECHR art. 8.  
66 Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Common Standard of Achievement (1999) p. 417. 
67 Nowak (1993) p.385. 
68 Ibid, p.372. 
69 ICCPR art. 21, UDHR art. 20(1), ECHR art. 11,  ACHPR art. 11. 
16 
 
and defense of common interest or to promote and protect public interest and human rights; 
and it can be held in various forms including indoor meetings, public conferences, 
demonstrations, vigils, marches, picket lines and other kinds of assemblies.70
 
  
Freedom of assembly is recognized as one of the foundations of a functioning democracy. 
It facilitates participation, dialogue and ensures all people in a society have the opportunity 
to express opinions they hold in common with others; as such, freedom of peaceful 
assembly constitutes a form of direct democracy.71
2.4.3   Freedom of Expression  
 
The freedom of expression is one of the essential rights of persons. Unlike freedom of 
association, freedom of expression was recognized in earlier human rights instruments. 
The French Declaration, for instance, considers the free communication of ideas and 
opinions as ‘‘the most precious of the rights of man’’.72 Today, freedom of expression is 
recognized both in international and regional human rights laws.73
 
 
Freedom of expression harbors a multitude of rights including the right to seek, receive, 
impart and disseminate information and ideas of all sorts, through any media and without 
borders.74
 
 The protection of freedom of expression extends not just to the content of the 
expression but also to the forms or mediums of expression such as oral, written, in print 
communications or art forms.  
Freedom of expression is closely linked to freedom of assembly and association but also to 
other rights, both civil and political, itself being in the overlapping zone. The UN Special 
Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression notes: 
 
…the exercise of the right to freedom of opinion and expression is a significant 
indicator of the level of protection and respect of all other human rights in a 
                                                 
70 Nowak (1993) p.74 .  
71 Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly (2007) P.13.   
72 The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789).    
73 See UDHR art. 19, ICCPR art. 19, ECHR art. 10, ACHR art. 13 and ACHPR art. 9.  
74 ICCPR art.19. 
17 
 
given society. ...the exercise of the right to freedom of opinion and expression is 
one of the essential foundations of a democratic society.75
 
 
Freedoms of association, expression and assembly entitle persons to exercise their rights 
collectively. Group of like-minded or concerned individuals can express their opinions and 
ideas among themselves or to other people on various issues in society. They may gather 
and compile information on the state of the country’s political, economic and human rights 
situation; document such developments, discuss the issues among themselves and share 
their concern with other people.    
 
The freedom to seek information entitles associations to look for, investigate, acquire and 
study information. This right is particularly important for human rights and development 
NGOs. The freedom to impart information enables associations to communicate the result 
of their research and study with anyone. They may make public statements; prepare 
publications, etc on current and ongoing situations like human rights situations, election 
observation and comments. Airing views and comments on topical issues is thus a right 
guaranteed in the international human rights treaties, and such statements, if based on facts 
and truth, are lawful even if they are against government stand or policy.76
 
  
In short, the right of individuals to associate and assemble is protected by the freedom of 
association and assembly, and the content of their discussion and expression of concern or 
view is protected by the freedom of opinion and expression. These freedoms are thus the 
basis for any grouping of individuals or civil society groups to come in to existence and 
undertake their role in society. The exercise of these rights is nonetheless subject to some 
limitations. 
2.4.4   Legitimate Limitations on the Basic Freedoms 
International instruments not only recognize the fundamental freedoms but also provide 
legitimate limitations to the exercise of such freedoms. The limitations on the fundamental 
freedoms emanate principally from the necessity to protect the rights and freedoms of 
others and the collective interest of the society/public. The law thus takes a delicate act of 
                                                 
75 La Rue (2009) pp. 4-12.      
76 Belyatesky et al v. Belarus,  para. 7.3. 
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balancing: it provides rights and freedoms to be exercised without interference by other 
individuals or the state but at the same time limits its exercise not to affect the rights of 
others. 
 
However, for any limitation to be legitimate it should fulfill certain requirements provided 
in human rights instruments.77 First, any limitation should be prescribed by law. 
Governments cannot legitimately impose any restriction without a law passed following 
the normal legislative procedure. Second, the limitations should be necessary in a 
democratic society. The measures taken must be in line with ‘‘the basic democratic values 
of pluralism, tolerance, broadmindedness, and peoples’ sovereignty’’.78 It must also be 
proportional to the objective sought to be achieved and severe restrictions like prohibition 
of formation or dissolution of an association would be disproportionate when milder 
actions are sufficient to avert the danger.79 Measures of prohibition or dissolution can be 
legitimately taken only as a last resort. Third, the restrictions must be justified by the 
legitimate purposes: it should be in the ‘‘interests of national security or public safety, 
public order…, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others’’.80
 
 Finally, these requirements must be fulfilled cumulatively to justify 
any limitation on freedom of association or other freedoms. The HRC in Belyatsky case 
opines: 
…the mere existence of reasonable and objective justifications for limiting the 
right to freedom of association is not sufficient. The State party must further 
demonstrate that the prohibition of an association is necessary to avert a real 
and not only hypothetical danger to national security or democratic order, and 
that less intrusive measures would be insufficient to achieve the same 
purpose.81
 
  
                                                 
77 See ICCPR arts.22 (2), 19(3) and 21; ECHR arts. 10(2) & 11 (2); ACHPR arts. 9, 10 (2) &11. The latter     
    provides only claw back clauses, the right to be exercised within the law which may subject the exercise of   
    rights to repressive laws.  
78 Nowak (1993) p.394. 
79 Ibid, p.394. 
80 ICCPR art. 22(2). See also arts. 19(3) and 21. 
81 Belyatsky et al v. Belarus,  para. 7.3. 
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The difficulty however is that the terms used to define the so called ‘‘legitimate purposes’’ 
lack specificity in scope and clarity in meaning which has often been exploited to impose 
restrictions that frustrate the fundamental freedoms. The limitations have been used by 
States as a means to prevent or discourage citizens from ‘‘joining undesirable groups’’ and 
to ‘‘restrict criticism and silence dissent’’.82 ‘‘Anti-regime’’ critics and activists and 
alleged ‘‘subversive associations’’ usually are persecuted for the expression they made 
under the guise of protecting legitimate public interests.83 So are ‘‘human rights defenders 
and unionists in retaliation for the exercise of their right to association, assembly and 
opinion and expression.84
2.4.5   State Obligation to Human Rights 
 
State obligations principally emanate from the specific instrument laying down the rights. 
For instance, the ICCPR obliges states ‘‘to respect and ensure to all individuals within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized’’ in the ‘‘Covenant without 
distinction of any kind’’, ‘‘to take necessary steps’’ ‘‘to give effect to the rights’’, to 
ensure ‘‘effective remedy’’ in case of violation and ‘‘enforce such remedies when 
granted’’.85
 
 Likewise, the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders in Article 2(1) 
declares: 
Each State has a prime responsibility and duty to protect, promote and implement 
all human rights and fundamental freedoms, inter alia, by adopting such steps as 
may be necessary to create all conditions necessary in the social, economic, 
political and other fields, as well as the legal guarantees required to ensure that 
all persons under its jurisdiction, individually and in association with others, are 
able to enjoy all those rights and freedoms in practice. 
 
Generally, human rights impose three types or levels of obligations on states: the 
obligation to respect, protect and promote.86
                                                 
82 La Rue (2009) p. 12. 
 Primarily, States have the (negative) 
obligation not to interfere with the right to form or join an association and participate in 
83 Nowak (1993) pp.345-46. 
84 La Rue (2009) p. 5.  
85 ICCPR art.2. 
86 Eide and Rosas (2001) p.23. See also HRC General Comment No. 31 (2004). 
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associations (vertical effect). This also means states should refrain from interfere in the 
activities of associations (CSOs). If for example members of a certain minority ethnic 
group seek to advance interests of the group by forming an NGO, the first obligation of the 
state is not interfere in the formation of the intended NGO and in its activities. As a civil 
and political right many aspects of the obligation of the state vis-à-vis freedom of 
association (and of assembly and expression) can be observed at this level.87 The problem 
is that states are intolerant to the activities of CSOs, especially those vocal and critical of 
the government. The opinions, expressions, views should be respected fully though they 
might be unwanted to the government.88
 
  
A sensitive issue in this regard is whether favour and encouragement by government of pro 
government trade unions and CSOs violates freedom of association. It can be argued that 
favour and encouragement of one CSO over the other to the extent of affecting the free 
choice of individuals to join an association or the activities of CSOs contradicts with the 
duty of the state to refrain from interference in individuals’ free choice and freedom of 
associations.89
 
 
Second, states have (positive) obligation to protect the rights of individuals and groups to 
form, join or participate in CSOs from interference by third parties (horizontal effect).90 
The obligation to take positive measures to ensure the protection of the choice and freedom 
of action of individuals and groups is crucial to the enjoyment of freedom of association 
like other freedoms.91 Measures to prevent forced membership, unjustifiable expulsion or 
exclusion and interference in the work of CSOs must be taken.92 Meetings, 
demonstrations, assemblies of CSO must be protected from interference including from 
counter-demonstrators.93
 
  
                                                 
87 Eide and Rosas(2001) p. 25. 
88 La Rue (2009) paras. 41-41. See also Declaration on Human Rights Defenders art. 6. 
89 Young, James and Webster v. UK, para.52. See also Observation of Committee of Experts on the 
    Application of Conventions and Recommendations 2010 Report regarding Ethiopian practice on trade   
    union freedoms.  
90 HRC General Comment No. 31 (2004) para. 8. 
91 Eide and Rosas (2001) p. 24. 
92 Young, James and Webster v. UK,  para. 428.  
93 Auli Kivenmaa v.Finland.  
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Third, states have the obligation to fulfill the rights of individuals and groups by 
facilitating the formation and functioning of civil societies. This may take various forms. 
States may have to provide an enabling legal and policy environment for the exercise of 
freedom of association, assembly and expression and thereby for the thriving of CSOs.94 
The state may have to establish an efficient legal regime for a quick and easy system of 
registration for acquiring legal personality for CSOs; facilitate unhindered access to and 
communication with similar bodies, to solicit and receive financial contributions and to 
engage in the promotion and protection of fundamental freedoms and rights.95
 
  
States have the obligation to ensure these rights to all persons ‘‘regardless of nationality or 
statelessness, such as asylum seekers, refugees, migrant workers and other persons, who 
may find themselves in the territory or subject to the jurisdiction of the State Party’’.96 
Moreover, national law cannot justify violation of these freedoms.97 If violation occurs, 
states have the obligation to provide the necessary remedy including ‘‘re-registration’’ and 
‘‘compensation’’ of dissolved associations, and ‘‘to take the necessary steps to prevent 
similar violations occurring in the future’’.98
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
94 HRC General Comment No. 31, 2004, para. 8. Declaration on Human Rights Defenders art. 2(1).  ICCPR  
    art. 2. 
95 UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders art.13. See also UDHR Preamble. 
96 HRC General Comment No. 31, 2004, para. 10. 
97 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) art. 27. 
98 Belyatsky et al v. Belarus, para 9. 
22 
 
 
 
 
3    Civil Society Operating Environment in Ethiopia 
3.1   Ideology and Political Environment 
The Ethiopian political landscape has been known to be rough with completely new 
ideologies surfacing following violent change of regimes: imperial monarchy, military 
Marxist-socialism and ‘‘Revolutionary Democracy’’. The voluntary sector has been trying 
to sail through these violent terrains. Besides various impediments in its journey, it faced a 
total ban during the Socialist regime. CSOs were once again able to operate in the country 
following the transition to democracy in 1991 with relative favorable policies and 
operating environment.  
  
The 1995 Constitution introduces an ‘‘important innovation in the history of the Ethiopian 
state’’ by providing for a ‘‘full liberal democratic structure of government’’.99 Multi-party 
electoral system, independent press and a range of civil and political rights are provided in 
the Constitution. But in practice, the Ethiopian democracy, often characterized as ‘‘pseudo 
democracy’’, lacks features of genuine democracy.100 It instead exhibits strong totalitarian 
characteristics the state having strong grip on the life of the society; political and civil 
space is tightly controlled.101 For some scholars, the turn to totalitarianism has been vivid 
particularly after the 2005 national election with a systematic and multi-pronged, including 
legislative, clampdown on political opposition, civil society, media and generally 
dissent.102
 
 Moreover, a single party (and a single person) has been ruling the country for 
nearly a quarter a century.  
                                                 
99 Vaughan and Tronvoll (2003) p. 132. 
100 Tronvoll (1997) p.17. See also Vaughan and Tronvoll (2003) pp. 132-35. 
101 Human Rights Watch, ‘‘One Hundred Ways of Putting Pressure’’: Violations  of Freedom of Expression  
     and  Association in Ethiopia,   March 2010 (herein after, HRW 2010 Report).  Abbink (2009) p 22-23. 
102 Aalen and Tronvol (2009). Teshome (2009). 
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Ideology wise, the Government considers liberal democracy non-workable to Ethiopian 
context. It rather follows a new brand of democracy, ‘‘Revolutionary Democracy’’, which 
advocates the establishment of ‘‘a democratic developmental state (government)’’ deemed 
imperative for the democratization, poverty reduction, peace and the very survival of the 
country.103 In a way, it resembles the Lee thesis (after Lee Kuan, former Prime Minister of 
Singapore) which also hinges on the survival psychology of Singapore as a state-a new 
small island state with no natural resources and threat from its large neighbors and its 
ethnic diversity.104 Although Revolutionary Democracy does not openly proclaim civil and 
political rights hamper development and are secondary in importance, the Lee thesis (also 
known as East Asian Model of development) does.105 Countries like Singapore, China and 
South Korea have been known for strong suppression of freedom of association and 
expression.106
 
 The repeated utterance by the Ethiopian Government of its determination to 
imitate the development path of these countries may corroborate similar mind set up.   
As has been observed in Singapore, whose law served as a benchmark for Ethiopian CSP, 
and in East Asia, competing with, and discrediting/criticizing acts, goals, etc. of a 
developmental state is highly undesirable.107 Civil and political life is controlled and 
channeled along the preferred government policy.108
 
 As we have seen above, the Ethiopian 
state has been showing most, if not all, of the above symptoms.  
Besides ideological inconsistency with independent and assertive civil society, the 
government has other concerns too: flow of foreign aid through NGOs (particularly after 
2005), NGO corruption, personnel competition from NGOs and lack of NGO commitment 
to social transformation, involvement in harmful activities like intelligence gathering by 
international NGOs, lack of indigenous character, etc that needed to be fixed.109
                                                 
103 Report by Council of EPRDF to the 6th Organizational Congress (2006) p.1. 
 At the 
same time, the government has been eager to work with NGOs with resources to be 
104 Tanaka (2002).  
105 Sen (1999) pp. 15-17,146-159. Sen rebuts the Lee thesis as having ‘‘little imperical support’’ and     
     ‘‘economic growth is more a matter of friendlier economic climate than of a harsher political system’’.  
106 Tanaka (2002) pp. 200-222. See Sen (1999) p.150. 
107 Tanaka (2002). 
108 Tanaka (2002).  Singapore has been ruled by a single party, The PAP, and three Prime Ministers, Lee   
     Kuan himself, his son-the current PM and Goh Chok, since 1959.   
109 Vaughan and Tronvoll (2003) p. 64.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Ethiopia’s Relations with  
     Non Governmental Organizations.        
     http://www.mfa.gov.et/Foreign_Policy_And_Relation/Multilateral.php?Page=Multilateral_11.htm   
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utilized for the economic and social development of the country as far as they work within 
the defined parameters.110 It is fair to say that Developmental Democracy, which appears 
to be inconsistent with liberal and republican tones of the Constitution,111
3.2   Regulatory Framework  
 aspires CSOs to 
be partners in the social and economic development of the country, at least temporarily, but 
does not entertain them much as an expression of peoples freedom. 
3.2.1   The Constitution  
The 1995 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) recognizes 
the freedom of association thereby providing the basis for civil society organizations in the 
country. As per Article 31 ‘‘[e]very person has the right to the freedom of association for 
any cause or purpose’’. The freedom of association is guaranteed to everyone without any 
qualification as to colour, race, religion, opinion (political or otherwise), place of 
residence, etc. Every person is entitled to form or join associations for any reason or 
purpose including the advancement of the rights and interests of members, rights and 
interests of other people, or any other personal conviction; so far as it is lawful there is no 
restriction as to the purpose for which an association may be established and carry out.  
 
The Constitution also provides two permissible grounds for interference in the freedom of 
association. Formation of an association in ‘‘violation of appropriate laws’’, or 
involvement ‘‘to illegally subvert the constitutional order’’ justify prohibition of an 
association. The second ground of interference can fall under the legitimate purposes 
specified in the ICCPR. But the first permissible ground, i.e., formation in ‘‘violation of 
appropriate laws’’, will undoubtedly raise questions of conformity with Article 22(2) of the 
ICCPR.112 The term is vague and broad thereby allowing subjective and intrusive 
interference.113
                                                 
110 Report by Council of EPRDF to the 6th Organizational Congress (2006) pp.47-48. 
 The ICCPR puts a high standard of three cumulative conditions to justify 
restrictions: measures must be put by law and are necessary in a democratic society to 
protect legitimate aims (protection of national security or public safety, public order, public 
health or moral, or the rights and interests of others). Any measure short of these standards 
111 Abbink(2009) pp. 3 and 6-7. 
112 See Infra notes 117-120 and 221-224 for possible interpretation. Ethiopia has not ratified the First    
    Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. See Supra notes 79-86 for discussions on the ICCPR. 
113 Hailegebriel (2010) p.9. 
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is not permissible limitation on freedom of association. Accordingly, the mere violation of 
law of incorporation is insufficient ground to justify prohibition of an association.114
 
  
Freedom of expression and assembly are also recognized in Articles 29 and 30 of the 
Constitution. There is much resemblance with the ICCPR provisions in particular and in 
some cases, these provisions contain clear protection than the ICCPR and the UDHR 
counter parts. For instance, Article 29(5) provides protection from homogeneous state 
propaganda by state financed or controlled media by requiring entertaining diversity in the 
expression of opinion.  
 
Moreover, the Constitution under Article 9(4) makes treaties ratified by the country part of 
the law of the land further entrenching the legal basis of civil society in the country.  
Nonetheless, the applicability of different legal regimes, domestic and international, in one 
jurisdiction gives rise to tensions as to status. 
3.2.2   Status of Human Rights Instruments 
Ethiopia has adopted major international and regional human rights treaties including the 
ICCPR and ICESCR that serve as a legally binding text of the UDHR, ACHPR and other 
agreements.115
 
 By virtue of Article 9(4) of the Constitution, these instruments form part of 
the law of the land, and hence part of the regulatory framework of CSOs. Nonetheless, 
which prevails in case of inconsistency or inconformity between the Constitution and 
human rights instruments has been a contentious issue due to two articles in the 
Constitution that give rise to seemingly different positions.  
One line of argument espoused is based on the supremacy clause, Article 9(1), that it puts 
the Constitution in a superior hierarchy than any law of the land including international 
instruments that are made part of the law of the land pursuant to Article 9(4). This 
conservative position is further supported by the hierarchy of the makers of the 
Constitution, Constitutional Assembly, which is a higher body than the adopting/ratifying 
                                                 
114 Belyatsky et al v. Belarus, para 7.3.  
115 See Office the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, Status by Country, Ethiopia.  
  http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/newhvstatusbycountry?OpenView&Start=1&Count=250&Expand=59#59 
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bodies of international instruments–the executive organ and the parliament. Furthermore, 
there is no need for interpretation when the constitutional provisions are clear. 
 
Another line of argument is that human rights instruments are superior because of article 
13(2) of the Constitution, which made interpretation of the Constitution to conform to ‘‘the 
principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenants on 
Human Rights and International instruments adopted by Ethiopia’’. This position is best 
explained as an exception to the principle of supremacy of the Constitution. In principle, 
the Constitution is superior to any agreement or law. For instance, no agreement or practice 
can change the state structure or Federal-Regional government power allocation. 
Nevertheless, the supremacy clause is qualified by article 13(2) with respect to 
fundamental human rights and freedoms section of the Constitution that they are subjected 
to conform to the principles enshrined in international instruments. Hence, human rights 
instruments prevail over chapter three of the Constitution or are at least equal in status. 
 
The latter line of argument is more plausible to this writer for the following reasons. First, 
to say rights and freedoms shall be interpreted in a manner conforming to the principles 
enshrined in international instruments, clearly tantamount to saying the fundamental rights 
and freedoms should be understood in line with the principles of human rights instruments. 
If its provisions are narrow in scope and less protective, one cannot say the Constitution 
conforms to principles of human rights instruments. Hence, when better protection is 
provided by international instruments to which the country is a party the constitutional 
principles on fundamental rights and freedoms are to be interpreted accordingly. If, for 
instance, the scope of protection of freedom of association is narrow under the 
Constitution, then pursuant to Article 13(2), it should be interpreted to conform to the 
wider scope of freedom of association as enshrined in international instruments like the 
ICCPR, UDHR or ACHPR. Second, the Constitution is made, by the makers of the 
Constitution themselves-the higher body-to be subjected to the principles of international 
human rights instruments by inserting Article 13(2). Third, interpretation of constitutional 
provisions is necessary, even if they are clear, when there is discrepancy between two 
applicable legal regimes. Hence, human rights instruments are superior to or at least as 
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equal as the Constitution. This line of argument would also give better protection to human 
rights and freedoms, and meaning to entering in to agreements and ratifying treaties.116
 
 
In practice, human rights instruments have no or little application,117 as ratified treaties are 
not published in the official government gazette to be cited by courts as law and as courts 
lack power to interpret the Constitution.118
3.2.3   The Charities and Societies Law 
 
Until recently there was no comprehensive CSOs legislation in the country.  The Civil 
Code of 1960 and the Association Registration Regulation of 1966 used to be the main 
legal documents in this regard. Nonetheless, with the coming in to force of the Charities 
and Societies Proclamation in February 2009 and the Charities and Societies Regulation 
(Regulation) in November 2009 previous legal regimes were repealed.119
 
 
The new law introduces many new developments to the voluntary sector. The classification 
of CSOs, area of operation, financial matters, supervisory activities, etc. seem fresh and 
baffling to the sector. The law introduces a bit complex system of classification of CSOs. 
Broadly CSOs are classified as Charities and Societies. A Charity is ‘‘an institution which 
is established exclusively for charitable purposes and gives benefit to the public.’’120 
Public benefit is deemed to exist where the ‘‘purposes of the Charity can generate an 
identifiable benefit to the public’’, ‘‘does not create a situation wherein its benefits exclude 
those in need’’ and generates private benefits only incidentally.121 The law gives 
illustrative list of charitable purposes under Article 14(2). Charities can be incorporated in 
one of the four forms: charitable endowments, charitable institutions, charitable trusts and 
charitable societies.122
 
  
A Society is ‘‘an association of persons organized on non-profit making and voluntary 
basis for the promotion of the rights and interests of its members and to undertake other 
                                                 
116 For a different position, see Enyew (2008) pp. 40-41. 
117 Messele (2002) p.39. 
118 FDRE Constitution art. 62(1). The House of Federation, a chamber of the parliament has the power to    
     interpret the Constitution. 
119 Proclamation No. 621/2009 art.110 and Regulation No168/2009 art.35. 
120 Ibid, art. 14. 
121 Ibid, art. 14(3). 
122 Ibid, art. 15(1). 
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similar lawful purposes as well as to coordinate  with institutions of similar objectives.’’123 
Societies are membership-based organizations established to promote rights and interests 
of its members and undertake similar purposes. A category of societies are ‘‘mass-based 
societies’’ which includes ‘‘professional associations, women’s associations, youth 
associations and other similar Ethiopian Societies’’.124 Charitable Societies have a mixed 
feature: they are membership based like societies and carry out charitable purposes like 
charities.125
 
 
Although the definition of societies may not exclude organizations like trade unions and 
teachers associations, they are out of the ambit of the law for special laws like the labour 
law and public service laws regulate them. Cultural and religious associations like Edir and 
Equb are also excluded.126
 
 
Charities and Societies are further classified in to:127
1) ‘‘Ethiopian Charities or Societies’’, those ‘‘formed under the laws of Ethiopia, all of 
whose members are Ethiopians, generate income from Ethiopia [or ‘use not more than 
ten percent of their funds which is received from foreign sources’] and wholly 
controlled by Ethiopians’’;  
  
2) ‘‘Ethiopian Residents Charities or Societies’’, those ‘‘formed under the laws of 
Ethiopia and which consist of members who reside in Ethiopia and who receive more 
than 10% of their funds from foreign sources’’128
3) ‘‘Foreign Charities’’, those ‘‘Charities formed under the laws of foreign countries or 
which consist of members who are foreign nationals or are controlled by foreign 
nationals or receive funds from foreign sources’’.  
; and 
 
The law makes the above classification based on source of income, residence and 
nationality of members, law of incorporation and control. The criteria have varying weight. 
If a Charity or Society uses more than ten percent its funds from abroad, it becomes 
                                                 
123 Ibid, art. 55(1). 
124 Ibid, art. 2(5).  
125 Ibid, art. 46(1). 
126 Ibid, art. 3(2).  
127 Ibid, art. 2(2-4). 
128 Ibid, art. 2(3).  The controlling Amharic version uses the term ‘‘all of its members reside in Ethiopia’’.   
     This form was not introduced in the original draft. 
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Ethiopian Residents Charity or Society even if all of its members are Ethiopian, 
incorporated in Ethiopia and is controlled by Ethiopians. Likewise, if a Charity has a 
foreign national member, it becomes Foreign Charity irrespective law of incorporation, 
source of income and control. Thus, the law heavily relies on source (percentage) of 
income and residence and nationality of members in classifying CSOs. Practically, there is 
no difference between Foreign and Ethiopian Residents CSOs and both can conveniently 
be called ‘‘foreign’’ CSOs129
 
. Furthermore, the law does not recognize foreign societies.  
The classification has marked consequence on the areas CSOs can intervene. Foreign and 
Ethiopian Residents CSOs cannot take part in the advancement of human rights, efficiency 
of the justice and law enforcement services and conflict resolution.130 These are areas 
reserved to Ethiopian CSOs. Though implausible, foreign organizations that operate in the 
country by virtue of an agreement with the government may still operate in those areas as 
the CSP is not applicable to them.131
 
 There is no such a possibility for local, Ethiopian 
Residents, CSOs that receive funds from abroad.  
The other new feature is the establishment of an administrative organ, the Charities and 
Societies Agency (Agency) that supervises and administers CSOs.132 The Agency has a 
General Director as a chief executive and a Charities and Societies Board (Board) as a 
higher body of the Agency. The Agency has extensive power to register, license, supervise 
and take any decision regarding CSOs including refusing registration, suspending and 
removing of CSOs officers, calling of general assembly and attending every general 
assembly meeting of CSOs, instituting inquiries, suspension and dissolution of CSOs and 
giving order it deems necessary.133 The law also provides for a Sector Administrator, a 
specialized executive organ assigned by the Minister of Justice to supervise and control 
operational activities of CSOs in its specialty area, and support the Agency.134
                                                 
129 Center for International Human Rights Northwestern University School of Law, Sounding the Horn: 
Ethiopia’s Civil Society Law Threatens Human Rights Defenders (2009)( herein after Sounding the Horn) pp. 
5-6. See also Human Rights Watch, “Ethiopia: New Law Ratchets Up Repression,” news release, January 8, 
2009.      
 The Agency 
130 Proclamation No. 621/2009 art. 14 (5). 
131 Ibid, art. 3(2) (b). 
132 Ibid, arts. 4-11. 
133 Ibid, arts. 4-6, 69, 76, 84, 86, 91, 92-93. 
134 Ibid, art. 2(12), 66-67. See also Mabrarya (Explanation) by the Ministry of Justice to the Draft Charities  
     and Societies Proclamation (2008) p. 25. (Herein after Mabrarya/Explanation) NB.: the Mabrarya was  
30 
 
is accountable to the Ministry of Justice that gives directives and policy guidelines for the 
Administration of CSOs.135
 
 The law thus establishes a complex system of administration. 
CSOs views the law as not enabling, cuts huge resource CSOs used to mobilize for 
marginalized and disadvantage millions, curbs positive development efforts, and violates 
citizens’ freedom of association. 136
 
 
However, the Government has been defending its virtue.137 It believes the law is 
imperative to ensure the realization of citizens' right to association, the transparency and 
accountability of CSOs, the legality of CSOs operation and provide measures to be taken 
against them in case of fault; to facilitate the role of CSOs in the overall development of 
Ethiopian peoples, to help CSOs understand their rights and obligations and promote 
indigenous organizations.138
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
     written on the Third Draft and caution is made when reference is made to the changes made in the final  
     version. 
135 Proclamation No. 621/2009 art 11(1). 
136 Comments of Ethiopian Civil Society Organizations on the Draft Charities and Societies Proclamation (16
  
        
November 2008).  Ethiopian CSOs Ad-hoc Taskforce Commentaries and Recommendations  on the    
     Latest Draft Charities and Societies Proclamation (Addis Ababa October 2008). 
137 Since recently the Government has been strongly rebutting in writing human rights groups and US State    
     Department reports. See Government’s response to HRW 2010 report entitled ‘‘No amount of external    
     pressure can force Ethiopia to abandon its independent path of Democracy and Development’’.   
     http://www.eprdf.org.et/EPRDFE/document/Response%20to%20HRW%20English.pdf 
     See also the Government’s response to US State Department 2009 Annual Human Rights Report:   
     ‘‘The US State Department Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ethiopia: Lies and Hypocrisy.’’       
     http://www.docstoc.com/docs/10897950/Ethiopias-Response-to-the-US-State-Department-Report-on 
138 Preamble of the CSP, Mabrary/Explanationa and Report by Council of EPRDF to the 6th Organizational  
     Congress (2006) p.37.  The Government believes that ‘‘the principal source of their [CSOs] finance  
     should be membership contribution or other domestic sources’’.   
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4    Main Limitations of the Charities and Societies Law  
4.1   Formation Requirements  
The CSP sets minimum requirements for the formation of CSOs of which legal nature, 
membership and capital requirements deserve treatment.  
 
Legal nature is the type or form by which civil societies can be lawfully established. As we 
have seen in the previous chapter, CSOs can be established as Ethiopian Charities or 
Societies, Ethiopian Residents Charities or Societies, or Foreign Charities principally based 
on Ethiopian residence, nationality and raising at least 90% of income locally. The legal 
form of CSOs and its effects like for instance, the activities the different types of CSOs can 
engage in and their source of income subtly determines with whom citizens can associate 
or not. For instance, it prohibits citizens to associate with Ethiopian nationals living abroad 
or foreign nationals to carry out human rights activities. It thus violates an important 
component of freedom of association: the free choice of individuals to decide with whom 
they want to associate.139
 
 
The law does not also recognize foreign societies. The Government reasons that as 
societies are established to protect the rights and interests of its members’ only citizens can 
form them.140
 
 In other words, non-nationals cannot exercise the freedom of association and 
form an association to protect their interests and rights. This is a clear contradiction to the 
country’s commitments under UDHR art 20, ICCPR arts 2 and 22, ICESCR arts 8 and 2, 
ACHPR art 2 and 10, the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders and CERD art 5(d) ix) 
that guarantees the freedom of association to every human being without distinction of any 
sort including nationality or race. Art 2(1) of the ICCPR states:  
                                                 
139 See Supra notes 51-54   
140 Mabrarya/Explanation p.23. 
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Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure 
to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status. [Emphasis added] 
 
The restriction on Ethiopian-resident nationals to associate with those in the Diaspora may 
be attributed to political opinion of the latter, which is also a protected right. Thus, the 
requirement for the formation of CSOs is discriminatory and inconsistent with the freedom 
of association as enshrined in various international instruments to which the country is a 
party. 
 
Minimum membership is another standard usually specified for the lawful establishment of 
civil societies. The minimum number required in democratic governance of associations is 
two though practically a higher number may be needed for an association to have proper 
institutional organization.141 Although the CSP is, for the most part, congruent with this 
international standard it has one problematic requirement, minimum representative 
membership, with respect to nationwide CSOs. Charities and Societies with federal 
character or nomenclature are required to have representative membership from or work 
place in at least five (of the total nine) regional states.142
  
 If for example a charity or society 
bears the name ‘‘Ethiopian’’ or purports to work at national level then it must have 
members from or work places in at least five regions. This requirement begs several 
questions.  What characterizes CSOs as federal? Why representation from or work place in 
two regional states is not enough? Is it not the federal character of CSOs that gives the 
federal government power/jurisdiction?  
Under the Constitution residual power, power not specifically granted to the Federal 
Government alone or concurrently with states, is granted to Regional States.143
                                                 
141 Freedom of Association: The Question of NGO Registration, OSCE Human Dimension Implementation   
 In the list 
     Meeting October 1998, Background Paper 5 (Warsaw, Poland: OSCE/ODIHR, 1998) paras. 6.1.1 and X. 
142 Proclamation No.621/2009 arts. 57(6) and 69(5). The English version of Article 57(6) uses the  
     conjunction ‘‘and’’ while the prevailing Amharic version uses ‘‘or’’ thereby making the requirements  
     alternative.  
143 FDRE Constitution art. 52(1). 
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of federal powers in Article 51 and 55, jurisdiction over CSOs that consist of members 
from two or more states or that operate in two or more regional states is not mentioned. For 
that matter, specific power over all matters that involve more than one state or those that 
involve individuals from more than one state is not granted to the Federal Government. 
Federal jurisdiction over interstate: commerce, transport and communication, rivers and 
highways as well as power to enact civil laws which are deemed ‘‘necessary to establish 
and sustain one economic community’’144 do not grant federal jurisdiction over all matters 
involving more than one state or individuals from more than one state. And it is hard to 
justify how civil society law falls in any of these clauses.145 Doing so may tantamount to 
saying marriage between individuals from two states is a federal matter, which is clearly 
not.146
 
  
The Federal Government assumed such power anyway and exercises power over matters of 
‘‘federal character’’. For instance, Federal Courts Proclamation No. 25/1996 as amended 
by Proclamation No.138/1998 granted federal courts jurisdiction over disputes between 
individuals from different states. Likewise, the Federal Government enacted the CSP to 
regulate CSOs because, inter alia, they operate in more than one regional state or its 
members are from more than one regional state, which suggests such CSOs have federal 
character.147 CSOs formed by members from one region and operate only in one region 
lack federal character, and are out of the ambit of the CSP and the jurisdiction of the 
Federal Government. The CSP departs from law and practice by introducing the 
requirements of representation from or involvement in at least five regional states for 
CSOs to be considered federal in character.148
                                                 
144 FDRE Constitution arts. 55(2)(b-c) and (6). 
 This requirement defeats the essence of 
federal nature and redefines it in a way that would also defeat the basis of the law to 
regulate CSOs by the federal Government. It is a poor legal formulation, and arbitrary and 
harsh limitation on the rights of citizens to form and participate in nationwide CSOs. With 
the financial constraint Ethiopian CSOs have and the requirement to allocate only up 30% 
145 See also  Hailegebriel (2009) p. 9. 
146 See Preamble of the Revised Family Code Proclamation No.213/2000. 
147 Proclamation No. 621/2009 art. 3(1). More bizarrely, the Federal Government assumes jurisdiction over  
     CSOs that receive more than 10% of their income from abroad though all of its members are from one  
     region and work only in one region. A Gurage Society that works in Gurage Zone becomes under the  
     Federal Jurisdiction just for receiving more than 10% of its income from abroad. Same is true for CSOs  
     that operate in two or more regions although all of its members are from one region.  
148 What is meant by ‘‘federal character’’ and its practical implication is not entirely clear.  
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of their expenses for administrative purposes, requiring them to have offices and necessary 
staff in five regions at the time of formation poses insurmountable challenge. CSOs that 
aspire to work nationwide when income and membership base allow doing so cannot be 
formed. These types of CSOs will be forced to change their purpose and/or name under the 
pain of cessation or deregistration.149
 
 
There seems a different requirement (a twist?) under the Regulation regarding CSOs with 
federal nomenclature where such CSOs shall change their name irrespective of 
representation or work places. Name of a CSO must be changed if it is ‘‘likely to give the 
impression’’ the CSO is connected in some way with the Government when it is not so 
connected or ‘‘is likely to mislead the public as to the true nature of the purposes [it] 
carries on.’’150
 
 Thus, for instance, the name ‘‘‘Ethiopian’ Human Rights Council’’ has the 
same effect and should be changed. 
The CSP also specifies limits on capital CSOs may collect during formation stage and 
amount they should have at the end of their financial year. CSOs are restricted not raise 
funds of more than 50,000 Ethiopian Birr in the formation stage.151 This hinders acquiring 
necessary funds particularly given the requirement that charities need to have more than 
50,000 in total asset at the end of the financial year. Failure to raise such an amount gives 
discretionary power to the Agency to transfer or divide its entire asset to other charities.152 
The law does not state the effect of such decision on the charity. Nonetheless, it can 
plausibly be argued that the effect of transfer and division of assets is pretty much the same 
as dissolution the effect of which is also liquidation of property.153
                                                 
149 Proclamation No. 621/2009 arts. 65( 4) and 69(5), and Charities and Societies Council of Ministers     
 This interferes with 
individuals’ right to form and participate in associations of their own no matter how big or 
small it might be. The size of a CSO cannot be a justification to divide its asset and 
eventually dissolve it. The measure cannot be justified by policy reasons, as there is no 
prohibition for a charity to continue with total assets of less than 50,000 birr.  
     Regulation No. 168/2009 (‘‘Regulation No. 168/2009’’ herein after). art. 9. 
150 Regulation No. 168/2009 art.5 (2-3). 
151 Proclamation No. 621/2009 art. 65(2). 
152 Proclamation No. 621/2009 art. 97(1)(a-c) and (4). 
153 Ibid, art. 94. 
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4.2   Mandatory Registration  
In many liberal democracies, only declaration or notification is enough for CSOs to 
lawfully operate and acquire legal personality.154 By contrast, registration and licensing is 
required in non-democratic or ‘‘illiberal democracies’’ for civil society organizations to 
lawfully operate and acquire legal personality. The purpose of such a system is purported 
to be supervision of lawfulness of CSOs activities. Some scholars argue that the 
introduction of the system of registration may not necessarily be inconsistent with freedom 
of association.155 While others like Sekaggya opines that mandatory registration 
undermines the freedom of association and is a common feature of many laws that restrict 
freedom of association.156 A common consequence of laws that require registration and 
prior authorization is criminalization of non-registered entities.157
 
 At any rate if registration 
is required, it should strike the balance between individuals’ freedom of association and the 
necessity of supervision, and it should not serve as administrative hurdle to deny freedom 
of association. 
The CSP introduces mandatory registration system where all charities and societies shall 
apply for registration and license within three months of formation.158 Merely formed 
CSOs lack legal capacity and personality to perform any lawful activity beyond those 
necessary for their formation, and most notably they cannot perform charitable purposes 
and cannot raise funds in excess of 50, 000 Birr (approximately $4, 000), nor perform 
activities in the interest of their members.159
 
   
Applicant CSOs are required to fulfill cumbersome registration requirements.160
                                                 
154 Jilani (2004) p.14. 
 Among 
others, CSOs must submit list of regions they intend to operate; names, addresses, ages, 
educational status, and nationalities of founders, officers, and members of CSOs and any 
relevant information required by the Agency. Some of these details especially about 
members are more than the necessary ‘‘basic facts’’ needed for supervision and hence 
indulges in the privacy of individuals.  
155 Nowak (1993) p. 395. 
156 Sekaggya (2009) p.16. 
157 Jilani (2004) p.14. 
158 Proclamation No. 621/2009 arts. 15(2) and 64(2). 
159 Ibid, arts 65 and 15(2). 
160 Ibid, art. 68 and Regulation No. 168/2009 arts 3-7.  
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Foreign Charities are required to present additional documents including authenticated 
certificate of registration from their country of origin, letter of recommendation from 
Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and letter of recommendation from the Embassy 
of their country of origin in Ethiopia, the absence of any of which is a cause for denial 
of license to operate in the country.161
 
 Not only some of these requirements are really 
unnecessary and bureaucratic but also gives leverage to filter out some ‘unwanted’ 
and ‘vocal’ international NGOs. 
The Agency has broad discretionary power to refuse registration. As per Article 69 an 
application for registration shall be refused if: 
 
1. the rules of the proposed charity or Society do not comply with the necessary 
conditions set by the Proclamation; 
2. the proposed Charity or Society is likely to be used for unlawful purposes or for 
purposes prejudicial to public peace, welfare, or good order in Ethiopia; 
3. the application for registration does not comply with the provisions of the law and 
any regulations made hereunder; 
4. the name under which the proposed Charity or Society is to be registered resembles 
the name of another Charity or Society, or any other institution, or is contrary to 
public morality, or is illegal; 
5. the nomenclature of the Charity or Society is countrywide and the composition of 
its members or its work place does not show the representation of at least five 
Regional States. 
 
Thus, registration can be refused even on frivolous grounds like irregularities in 
application and name resemblance and on vague and sinister grounds of lack of 
representation of five regional states for federal character or nomenclature CSOs or of 
likelihood of being used for unlawful proposes. The latter is one of the very broad and 
vague grounds of refusal. The phrase ‘‘… is likely to be used…’’ does not provide a clear 
measurement and gives too much room for subjective judgment and discretion to refuse 
registration even on unfounded and groundless assumptions. Moreover, unlike other cases, 
                                                 
161 Ibid, art. 68(4). 
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there is no possibility of subsequent registration of CSOs denied registration under this 
ground.  
 
Failure to register and refusal of registration results in the dissolution of the formed 
association. However, the decision of the Agency to refuse registration is not appealable to 
courts. Undertaking charitable activities and activities in the interest of members without 
registration and license is a violation of the CSP, which is criminalized under Article 
102(1).162
4.3   Restriction on Human Rights Advocacy 
 Therefore, mandatory registration system, cumbersome registration 
requirements and discretionary power of the registering authority to refuse registration 
severely threatens the free formation of CSOs and the free exercise of freedom of 
association.  
One of the most controversial aspects of the CSP is its restriction on human rights 
advocacy. The law allows human rights activities only to Ethiopian CSOs as opposed to 
Foreign and Ethiopian Residents CSOs. These activities include: 
 
          j) the advancement of human and democratic rights; 
         k) the promotion of equality of nations, nationalities and peoples and that of    
             gender and religion; 
         l) the promotion of the rights of the disabled and children’s rights; 
        m) the promotion of conflict resolution or reconciliation; 
        n) the promotion of the efficiency of the justice and law enforcement services.163
In the Mabrarya to the draft law, the Government provides three reasons to justify the 
restriction.
 
164
                                                 
162 Ibid, arts. 64(2) and 15(2). Unlike earlier drafts the law criminalizes unregistered CSOs  by putting a  
 First, these activities are political or related to politics to be carried out only 
by the government and citizens. Second, the restriction is necessitated to protect the 
harmony between nations, nationalities and peoples, which might be destabilized, 
knowingly or unknowingly, by Ethiopian Residents and Foreign CSOs. Third, it is not just 
to give equal rights to such CSOs with homegrown ones. 
     general provision in article 102 which does not specify the sanction.  
163 Regulation No. 168/2009 art. 14 (2) (j-n) and 14(5). 
164 Mabrarya/Explanation p. 16. 
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This restriction (and its justifications) raises several questions of compatibility with 
freedom of association and other rights and principles. To begin with, the labeling of 
human rights advocacy as political is troubling. There are economic and social rights that 
are distinct from political rights. The adoption of separate international covenants in 1966 
is one proof of the distinction. Besides, Article 25 of the ICCPR provides distinct political 
rights, usually referred to as democratic rights. The FDRE Constitution also follows similar 
approach while stipulating political rights and uses the term ‘‘every Ethiopian national…’’ 
while it uses terms like ‘‘everyone’’ in other cases.165 These rights mainly relates to the 
right to elect and be elected, and participate in government administration. Because of their 
nature, only citizens may exercise the latter types of rights while civil rights are universal. 
There are of course some freedom rights that fall in the gray zone between political and 
civil rights like the freedom of association, assembly and expression.166 Although these 
freedom rights have important role in the exercise of political rights they are also civil 
rights exercised by individuals protected from state interference.167
True, increased awareness of citizens about their rights and freedoms will undoubtedly 
have significant impact on their behavior and in the exercise of their rights and 
freedoms.
 Moreover, as discussed 
in chapter two, these freedom rights are recognized as universal rights in human rights 
instruments.   
168 The more citizens become aware of their rights the more demanding and 
protective they become.169
 
 Nonetheless, neither the effect of human rights advocacy in 
raising awareness of citizens’ rights nor the effect of increased awareness of citizens’ 
human rights on their behavior and in the exercise of their rights equates them to be 
political. The interrelatedness and interdependence of human rights has long been 
espoused; it does not however mean socio-economic rights and civil rights become 
political per se. To consider human rights activities as political blurs the distinction, is 
unscientific and will not serve good cause. 
                                                 
165 FDRE Constitution art 38.  
166 Nowak (1993) pp.338,385-388. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Vaughan and Tronvoll (2003) p. 70. 
169 Sen (1999).  
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Furthermore, the restriction on advocacy on human rights and democracy is contrary to 
various human rights instruments. To mention a few, it contradicts Articles 5 and 6 of the 
Declaration on Human Rights Defenders that recognize the right of everyone, individually 
or in group at national or international level, to promote and protect human rights. It is also 
against the UDHR, which in its preamble declares the right of ‘‘…every individual and 
every organ of society, […to] strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these 
rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure 
their universal and effective recognition and observance….’’ (Emphasis added). The 
restriction is also contrary to the country’s commitment under the Cotonou Agreement, 
which considers civil society organizations as ‘‘partner’’ and ‘‘supplementary’’ to the state 
in the development process including in the political dimension where good governance, 
democracy and human rights constitute core components.170
 
 To restrict human rights 
activities is thus a violation of human rights standards that entitle all individuals and civil 
society organizations (local and international), as an organ of society, to engage in the 
promotion and protection of human rights.  
The other issue is the equation of local CSOs that receive more than 10% of their income 
from abroad, and CSOs that consist of foreign resident Ethiopian nationals as ‘‘foreign’’. 
Why not raising for example 89% or 70% of their income locally is not enough to make 
them Ethiopian when they exclusively consist of and controlled by Ethiopians, and 
incorporated under Ethiopian law? Although there might be conditions attached to foreign 
grants the mere receiving of such grants let alone as small as 11% cannot change their 
nationality. Nor is citizens’ foreign residence a just cause for discrimination. This is simply 
subtle restriction on the right of citizens to exercise freely and fully the right of association. 
It unjustly restricts citizens’ right to freely form and participate in independent CSOs to 
pursue their rights and convictions, i.e., promotion of human rights, justice and equality in 
their country.    
 
The arbitrariness looms large when seen together with Article 57 which singles out 
Ethiopian mass-based Societies as having ‘‘…the right to actively participate in the process 
of strengthening democratization and election, particularly in the process of conducting 
                                                 
170 Cotonou Agreement arts. 2, 4, 8-10. 
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educational seminars on current affairs, understanding the platforms of candidates, 
observing the electoral process and cooperating with electoral organs’’. The purpose of this 
article is vague given Article 14(2&5) which allows advancement of human and 
democratic rights to Ethiopian CSOs, and seems to imply that other CSOs may not involve 
in those processes.  
4.4   Control of Funding   
Although access to fund is an important aspect of freedom of association, countries 
especially in the developing world have been increasingly controlling access to foreign 
funding with the purported rationale of curbing foreign influence. Of course, CSOs are not 
immune from manipulation. Edwards argues that countries like Russia have been using 
civil society to destabilize non-loyal former Soviet Satellite states.171 Besides, the donor 
influences the agenda and the activities of CSOs. Governments thus have the right and 
responsibility to safeguard public interest from the adverse effects of ‘‘bad civil 
society’’.172 However, control on foreign funding has been used for sinister purposes, to 
‘‘starve civil society out of resources’’.173 As CSOs in these countries cannot raise 
sufficient fund locally to run their activities denial of access to foreign funding denies their 
financial independence and eventually forces them to cease operation.174
 
  
The CSP does not altogether ban soliciting and receiving foreign funding. It rather restricts 
its use. Foreign funds obtained by CSOs in excess of 10% of their annual income cannot be 
used to promote human rights and democracy. In other words, CSOs that receive more than 
10% of their income from abroad cannot engage in the above types of activities. If the 
source of the fund is foreign, whether from Ethiopian nationals or international agencies, it 
cannot be used to support democracy and human rights activities.175
 
  
Under the CSP, control of access to funding is not limited to foreign sources; access to 
local funds is also strictly controlled. CSOs can conduct public collection only with the 
                                                 
171 Edwards (2009) p.xi. 
172 Chambers and Kopstein (2001). 
173 Global Tends in NGO Law, p. 9. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Proclamation No.621/2009 arts. 2(15) and 14(2)(5).   
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permission of the Agency and in accordance with its strict conditions.176 The Agency has a 
wide power to refuse permission or revoke one.177
 
 Moreover, the CSP does not provide 
financial benefits or tax exemptions.   
Denial of access to fund effectively curtails free and full exercise of freedom of association 
by rendering it to an exercise in the formation of associations without protecting its 
continued existence.178
 
 It denies CSOs financial security and operational independence 
forcing them to close down. It thus constrains freedom of association in the gravest of 
cases. In a poor country like Ethiopia where it is not possible to raise meaningful amount 
of fund locally, the restriction on foreign funds means human rights organizations faces 
closure of offices and staff layoffs, if they do not cease operation. Lack of fund denies 
citizens right to organize in a perpetual way to influence positively the human rights and 
democratic process in their country. In addition, the restriction is a violation of Article 13 
of the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders which recognizes ‘‘the right, individually 
and in association with others, to solicit, receive and utilize resources for the express 
purpose of promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms through 
peaceful means’’.  
The 10% cap on foreign funding is not only an arbitrary restriction, it is also unreasonable 
and paradoxical for a government that gets 30% of its annual budget from foreign 
donation.179
                                                 
176 Ibid, art. 98 (2) and Regulation No.168/2009 art. 15 (1)(b). 
 The strict regulation of public collection, which undoubtedly is going to be 
very important source of income for Ethiopian CSOs could serve to starve ‘‘unsuitable’’ 
CSOs out of resources threatening freedom of association and the freedom of associations. 
Furthermore, the obligation to disclose members and source of any income opens the door 
for intimidation of donors to and fee-paying members of, especially ‘‘unwanted’’, CSOs, 
further drying local financial sources.   
177 Proclamation No 621/2009 arts. 48(3) cum 69(2), arts. 100 (1-3) and 70(1-5). 
178 See Supra note 57-66. 
179 Development Assistance Group (DAG) to Ethiopia.    
     http://www.dagethiopia.org/Pages/DagCommon.aspx?MenuCaption=ODA%20to%20Ethiopia.  
     Abbink muses the 24 billion USD EPRDF Government received in development aid between 1991 and  
     2008 brought no observable development. Abbink (2009) p.19. 
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4.5   Strict and Invasive Supervision  
The law provides various mechanisms of supervision of CSOs and very broad power for 
supervising authorities some of which are not subject to judicial review. The principal 
mechanisms include reporting and disclosure, inquiry, licensing, and suspension and 
removal of officers. As we will see in the following sections, these measures can be deeply 
intrusive on the organizational and operational independence of CSOs. 
4.5.1   Reporting and Disclosure  
The law imposes multiple reporting obligations on CSOs. They are required to submit to 
the Agency annual activity report accompanied by relevant information regarding the 
CSO,180 annual statement of accounts181 and annual report of bank accounts with necessary 
particulars.182 The Agency has also power to request any of the above reports any time for 
any special reason. In addition, Societies have the responsibility to notify the Agency in 
writing the time and place of any meeting of the general assembly at least seven days 
before the meeting.183
 
  
CSOs as well as officers and employees also have the duty to disclose and provide any 
information or document required by the Agency be it about members, officers, 
employees, donors, or even about any other CSO.184 Reporting and disclosure has thus 
passed what is necessary for administration purposes and seems to serve other purposes, 
‘‘intelligence’’ gathering, as used in some other countries thereby creating unnecessary 
burden in the free exercise of freedom of association besides violating privacy.185
4.5.2   Inquiry  
 
The law grants the Agency sweeping investigative power.  It can institute inquiries and 
inspect any time any CSOs or class of CSOs, ether generally or for particular purposes.186
                                                 
180 Proclamation No. 621/2009 art. 80(1-3). 
 
For the purpose of the inquiry, the Agency has the power to order any CSO or officer or 
employee to furnish accounts and statements, copies and original documents, attend in 
181 Ibid, art. 78(1). 
182 Ibid, art. 83. 
183 Ibid, art. 86. 
184 Ibid, arts. 85(1) and 63. 
185 Segaggya (2009) p.23. 
186 Proclamation No. 621/2009 art. 84(1). 
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person, give evidence and produce documents.187
 
 The Agency can also use any source of 
information for the purpose of the inquiry. 
The law, however, provides no procedural protection though the result of the inquiry may 
lead to dissolution of CSOs and administrative sanctions for officers and employees. The 
evidence collected is also admissible for any criminal proceedings.188
4.5.3   Renewal of License  
 The absence of 
notice, hearing and representation by a lawyer coupled with the absence of judicial 
recourse for most CSOs negates the established principle of due process and gives 
unchecked power to the executive. 
To operate lawfully, CSOs should obtain license which should be renewed every three 
years.189
 
 The Agency renews license after evaluating performance and audit reports of 
CSOs and obedience to the laws, directives and orders of the Agency. If CSOs default on 
any of these requirements, the Agency has power not to renew the license, which, as we 
will see later, results in the dissolution of the CSO.     
Denial of license to cease the operation of an association for not observing the order of the 
Agency is an abject contradiction to the freedom of association, which can only be limited 
in accordance with law made to protect national security, public safety, morality, and rights 
and freedoms of others that is necessary in a democratic society.190 The same goes for poor 
performance and errors in reports and so on. The broad discretionary power of licensing is 
thus menacing, which can be abused to deny license to independent and strong CSOs for 
being vocal and critical of government.191
4.5.4   Intrusive Orders 
 
The power of the Agency is so vast that it can give any order and take measures on CSOs 
and personnel it deems necessary. It can order a CSO to improve its system of operation 
and suspend and remove its officers when it finds misconduct or mismanagement of 
                                                 
187 Ibid, art. 84(2). 
188 Ibid, arts. 105(2) and 71(2). 
189 Ibid, art. 76. 
190 Belyatsky et al v. Belarus,  para 7.3. 
191 See Aalen and Tronvoll (2009) pp. 13-19 regarding government practice in this respect. 
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property of the CSO, prevent such CSOs from undertaking obligations and payments, and 
assign an auditor to examine accounts of CSOs.192 It has also the power to order the 
removal and replacement of officers that are incapable for the position as per Article 70 
that includes absence from Ethiopia.193 Moreover, the Agency may, upon the request of 
any member or officer of the Society order the chairperson to convene the meeting of the 
General Assembly or convene by its  own and conduct the meeting by nominating 
chairperson of the meeting who has a casting vote in case of a tie.194
 
  
These powers of the Agency call for interference on the internal management and 
governance of CSOs.195
4.6   Disproportionate and Extra Judicial Sanctions 
 It compromises the independence of CSOs to run their affairs free 
from government hand. In some cases, just like in public offices, the government has 
power to give direct orders on how the CSO should be administered and who should be in 
office, etc.  
The CSP specifies various sanctions on CSOs and persons who violate the provisions of 
the law. The sanctions range from fine to dissolution of CSOs and imprisonment of 
individuals which raises questions of proportionality and necessity and conformity with the 
requirements under Art.22 (2) of the ICCPR) as well as the Constitution.  
4.6.1   Suspension and Dissolution of CSOs 
Suspension is one of the many sanctions the Agency can take on any CSO which it thinks 
has not complied with the provision of the CSP, the Regulation, directives or order of the 
Agency or even the CSOs own rules. It is a temporary measure taken until a CSO 
complies, corrects faults and provides any information required by the Agency.196 Non-
compliance to rectify the faults within the time set by the Agency constitutes a ground for 
cancellation of license or non-issuance for newly formed CSOs.197
                                                 
192 Proclamation No. 621/2009 arts. 90 and 87(3) and Regulation No.168/2009 art. 29(3). 
 License shall also be 
193 Proclamation No. 621/2009 art. 91. 
194 Ibid, art. 61. 
195 Hailegebrail (2009). 
196 Proclamation No. 621/2009 arts. 92(1) (a) and 92(1) (a-d).  
197 Ibid, art. 92(2)(c). 
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cancelled if registration is procured by fraud, or misrepresentation, the CSO has been used 
for unlawful or prejudicial purposes or commits criminal acts.198
  
 
The ultimate consequence of cancellation of license is dissolution, the most serious 
measure applicable against legal persons. The CSP provides dissolution as an executive 
measure that can be taken against ‘‘defaulting’’ CSOs. A CSO can be dissolved if: 
 
i) its registration has been obtained by fraud or misrepresentation;199
ii) it has been used for unlawful purposes or purposes prejudicial to public peace,    
 
      welfare or security;200
iii) it could not rectify: its rules that do not comply with the necessary conditions of the  
 
           CSP; the application for registration that does not comply with the CSP or any    
           Regulation; its name that resembles with any CSO, public institution, is immoral   
           or illegal; or a nationwide CSO could not have representative membership from or    
           work place in five regional states;201
iv) its license is not renewed  due to poor performance and inaccurate and incomplete 
  
     audit reports, violation of the provisions of the CSP, the Regulations or directives     
     or orders of the Agency or the CSO own rules; 202
v) commits a crime in violation of the Criminal Code.
or 
203
 
 
The Regulation adds further grounds for dissolution. See for instance Articles 7(4) 
(registering in a form not applicable to it), 22(3) (failure to operate in two years), 23(3) 
(utilizing the proceeds of any income generating activities for purposes other than its 
objectives), 24 (failure to notify meetings for more than once), 26(8) (failure to provide 
detailed information about officers and members) and 28 (failure to display certificate). In 
case of violation of the some of the above articles, the Agency may give warning but only 
once, meaning the CSO will be dissolved the next time even for not fulfilling the orders of 
the Agency within the time it sets. Thus, Articles 92 and 93 of the CSP read together with 
                                                 
198 Ibid, art. 92(2) (a-e). 
199 Ibid, arts. 92(2) (a) and 93(1) (b). 
200 Ibid, arts. 92(2) (b) and 93(1) (b). 
201 Ibid, arts. 69(1, 3-5) and 93(2) (c) and 93(1) (b). 
202 Ibid, arts. 92(2) (d) and 93(1) (b). 
203 Ibid, art. 92(2) (e) and 93(1) (b). 
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the Regulation makes violation of virtually all provisions of the CSP a ground for 
cancellation of license and eventual dissolution of CSOs. 
 
Many of the grounds for dissolution of charities and societies are incongruent with 
legitimate grounds for limitation of freedom of association under the Constitution and 
International instruments, particularly the ICCPR. The Constitution allows dissolution of 
CSOs if formed in violation of the appropriate laws or is involved to illegally subvert the 
constitutional order. On the contrary, the CSP prescribe dissolution of any charity or 
society on frivolous grounds like poor performance, submission of faulty reports, non-
compliance with the orders of the Agency (which may relate to anything) or the provisions 
of the CSP and Regulation or any directives of the Agency, etc. Certainly, these grounds 
are not related to involvement to illegally subvert the constitutional order204
 
, and hence are 
contrary to the constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of association.  Establishing 
and participating in associations is the constitutional right of individuals irrespective of, for 
instance, how efficient the Society is. 
Many of the grounds of dissolution do not also fall under the legitimate grounds of 
limitation of freedom of association in Article 22(2) of the ICCPR. The only ground of 
dissolution in the CSP that may conform to the ICCPR Article 22(2) is the use of the CSO 
for ‘‘purposes prejudicial to public peace, welfare or security’’. There are however some 
cases where dissolution may be justified under the Constitution but not under the ICCPR. 
Take for instance a nationwide CSO formed without representation from or work place in 
five regional states. This is clearly a CSO formed in violation of Article 69(5) of CSP and 
hence can be dissolved without violating the constitutional freedom of association. The 
same is true if an Ethiopian Charity is registered under immediate registration procedures 
of Article 7 of the Regulation or without accepting the model rules of the Agency. The 
question is do dissolution measures against such CSOs conform to Ethiopia’s obligation 
under the ICCPR.  
 
As we have seen in chapter two, to qualify as a legitimate limitation under the ICCPR, the 
limitation must be taken for violation of laws enacted to safeguard public safety, security, 
                                                 
204 See Supra note 102 on conformity of this requirement with the ICCPR art. 22(2). 
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order, health, moral and rights and interests of others, and the measures must be necessary 
in a democratic society. Prohibiting establishing a nationwide CSO with members from 
four regions or dissolving an Ethiopian Charity for registering under immediate 
registration procedure has nothing to do with any of the above grounds and mere violation 
of law is not sufficient ground to justify dissolution.205
 
 Nor is it necessary or proportional 
to dissolve such CSOs.  
The requirement of necessity is not (at least not expressly) stated in the Constitution. It is 
however one of the three cumulative requirements under the ICCPR. Restriction on 
freedom of association must be in line with hallmarks of democracy such as tolerance and 
pluralism. Moreover, when taking measure is necessary, it must be proportional: 
dissolution should not be ordered when milder sanctions are enough in the circumstances 
of the case. But under the CSP dissolution is possible even for minor causes like not 
displaying a certificate, poor performance or non-compliance with orders of the Agency, 
etc. A lot less threatening measures would be enough in many of these cases. Therefore, as 
we have seen in section 3.3.2, the narrow scope of freedom of association under Article 31 
of the Constitution must be interpreted to conform to Article 22(2) of the ICCPR as per 
Article 13(2) of the Constitution for the country to abide by its obligation. 
 
It is worth restating here the Views of the HRC in Belyatesky case where it discussed at 
length the issue of dissolution of human rights NGO, “Viasna”, by Belarus for alleged 
repeated violation of electoral law and procedure and concluded:  
 
…even if “Viasna”’s perceived violations of electoral laws were to fall in the 
category of the ‘repeated commission of gross breaches of the law’, the State 
party has not advanced a plausible argument as to whether the grounds on which 
“Viasna” was dissolved were compatible with any of the criteria listed in article 
22, paragraph 2, of the Covenant. As stated by the Supreme Court, the violations 
of electoral laws consisted of “Viasna”’s non-compliance with the established 
procedure of sending its observers to the meetings of the electoral commission 
and to the polling stations; and offering to pay third persons, not being members 
                                                 
205  See Infra note 206. 
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of “Viasna”, for their services as observers…. Taking into account the severe 
consequences of the dissolution of “Viasna” for the exercise of the author’s and 
his co-authors’ right to freedom of association, as well as the unlawfulness of the 
operation of unregistered associations in Belarus, the Committee concludes that 
the dissolution of the association is disproportionate and does not meet the 
requirements of article 22, paragraph 2. The authors' rights under article 22, 
paragraph 1 have thus been violated.206
 
 
The other issue is the CSP provides sanctions of suspension, cancellation and dissolution 
as extra-judicial measures, to be taken by the Agency. Only the dissolution of Ethiopian 
CSOs is effected by the order of the Federal High Court. Thus, the majority of CSOs can 
be suspended or dissolved without involving the judicial process. In a parliamentary 
system like Ethiopia with a dominant ruling party and a weak ‘‘upper house’’, the 
exclusion of the judicial process means that in effect the laws that restrict freedom of 
association are made, applied and executed by the executive organ, which constitutes a 
serious breach of constitutionalism, separation of powers and due process. 
 
Therefore, given its serious consequence on CSOs (liquidation and non-existence) and 
individuals’ freedom of association, dissolution should have been provided as a judicial 
measure. Moreover, it should be prescribed as a measure of last resort when no milder 
measures are sufficient to avert the danger to national security or public safety, public 
order, public health or public moral or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.  
4.6.2   Administrative and Criminal Sanctions 
The CSP also stipulates administrative and criminal sanctions in Article 103(2&3). 
Administrative sanctions (fines) are applicable on CSOs that fails to keep accounting 
records, to submit statements of accounts and activity report and to allocate 70% its budget 
for operational purposes. Such acts are punishable with fine up to 100,000 birr. 
Participation in the above-mentioned criminal acts by employees is punishable with fine up 
to 20,000 birr. As per Article 102(1), contravention of the CSP by any CSO or person also 
entails punishment as provided in the Criminal Code. 
                                                 
206 Belatesky and etal v. Belarus, Para 7.5. 
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In addition, CSOs personnel may face imprisonment under the Criminal Code. But the law 
fails to specify the offence and punishment under which these individuals will be 
prosecuted. This opens the possibility of prosecuting individuals under severe criminal 
provisions without observing the criminal law principle of giving proper notice of offences 
and punishments.207
  
  
Unlike the usual criminal procedure,208
4.7   Denial of Access to Court and the Right to Appeal   
 the Agency investigates crimes committed by 
CSOs or personnel. Per Article 105(2), the Agency collects and organizes any evidence 
necessary for the criminal prosecution and submits it to the appropriate organ. In essence, 
the police may involve in the investigation process principally when there is a need for 
more evidence. 
As we have seen above, the Agency determines measures for violation of the CSP. Any 
decision of the Agency on majority of CSOs, Ethiopian Residents and Foreign, is not 
appealable to courts. With the exception of Ethiopian CSOs, CSOs have the right only to 
administrative review by the Board.209 The Government reasons that non-Ethiopian CSOs 
operate in the country because of government permission, and action taken for violating 
condition of the permit should not be litigated before courts as they do not have right in the 
first place.210 We have seen before how flawed this argument is.211
 
  
The right to access to court and appeal is recognized in the Constitution and human rights 
instruments. Art 20(6) of the FDRE Constitution states: ‘‘[a]ll persons have the right of 
appeal to the competent court against an order or a judgment of the court which first heard 
the case.’’ This provision seems to presuppose that a court should first hear the case from 
whose decision appeal can be lodged; and as the Agency (not a court) suspends and 
dissolves CSOs there is no court decision to appeal to a court.  On the contrary, Article 37 
of the Constitution declares ‘‘everyone’’, ‘‘any association’’ and ‘‘any group’’ has the 
‘‘right to bring a justiciable matter to, and to obtain a decision or judgment by, a court of 
                                                 
207 Sounding the Horn, p. 6. 
208 See Criminal Procedure Code Proclamation, Negarit Gazeta, (1961) arts. 8-18. 
209 Proclamation No. 621/2009 art. 104. 
210 Mabraria/Explanation p.39-40. 
211 See Supra note 165-171. 
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law or any other competent body with judicial power’’. And as per Article 79(1) 
‘‘[j]udicial powers are vested…in the courts’’. Clearly, actions that limit one’s freedom are 
‘‘justiciable’’. Hence, it is a constitutional right to bring actions that affect freedom of 
association to a court of law. Ousting of courts to hear ‘‘justiciable matters’’ at least by 
way of review is thus unconstitutional.   
 
Article 7(1) of the ACHPR also recognizes the right to access to courts and appeal 
succinctly: 
  
Every individual shall have the right to have his case heard. This comprises: a) 
the right to an appeal to competent national organs acts violating his 
fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by conventions, law, 
regulations and customs in force. 
 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights applied this principle in numerous 
cases involving Nigeria where it found out that the ouster of courts, by  decrees, to review 
acts of the executive organ is a violation of the right to have access to courts and the right 
to judicial appeal under Articles 7(1) and 26 of the ACHPR. In Civil Liberties 
Organization case, the Commission held: 
 
The ousting of jurisdiction of the courts … constitutes an attack of incalculable 
proportions on Article 7…  An attack of this sort on the jurisdiction of the courts 
is especially invidious, because while it is a violation of human rights in itself, it 
permits other violations of rights to go unredressed. 212
 
 
Thus, denying access to court or appeal is a violation of the country’s commitment under 
the ACHPR. In addition, the adjudication system under the CSP contradicts ‘‘the right of 
every one to have his case heard and determined by an independent, competent and 
impartial tribunal’’.213 The Board, being a higher body of the Agency, whose members 
may not have legal background and are all nominated by the Government,214
                                                 
212 Civil Liberties Organization v. Nigeria,  para. 14.   See also The Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria. 
 it can hardly 
213 ICCPR art. 14(1).   
214 Proclamation No. 621/2009 arts. 9, 8(1-2) 
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be independent, impartial and competent. An organ of the executive branch, the Agency, 
suspends or dissolves CSOs said to contravene its directives or orders, or Regulations 
enacted by the Council of Ministers-also an executive organ-or even the Proclamation 
itself, which is enacted by a parliament dominated by members of the ruling party. Thus, 
when practically one organ enacts the law, applies and enforces it with no judicial 
involvement the process cannot be fair and impartial and the remedy cannot be adequate 
and effective.215
 
  
Hence, prohibition of access to courts and judicial review of administrative decisions 
seriously challenges the principles of due process, constitutionalism and separation of 
power which protect individuals’ rights and freedoms from arbitrary interference by the 
state by putting a check and balance on the powers of the government. The law also 
discriminates individuals on irrelevant grounds.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
215 ICCPR arts. 2(3)(a) and 14(1). 
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5   The Wider Implications of the Charities and Societies Law 
5.1   Enforced Changes on Civil Society Organizations  
More than a year after the CSP entered in to force, some of its effects on CSOs are already 
discernible. The stringent requirements of the law on membership, funding, types of 
activities, etc. meant CSOs had to undergo massive transformations to survive. CSOs had 
to reregister in one of the legally defined forms: Ethiopian Charities or Societies, Ethiopian 
Residents Charities or Societies, or Foreign Charities. Unfortunately, operating in any of 
these forms entails a relinquishment of one or another of what they use to be.216
 
 Foreign 
and Ethiopian Residents CSOs have the advantage to access foreign fund. But such CSOs 
have to engage in limited activities considered by the government non-political.   
Perhaps registering as Ethiopian CSO is more constraining. Although Ethiopian CSOs can 
engage in all types of lawful activities, in practice, the limitation on funding on such CSOs 
prevents them from engaging in a meaningful way in any activity. The country being one 
of the most impoverished nations in the world with poor philanthropic culture-where at 
least 95% of CSOs are almost totally dependent on foreign funding-raising sufficient 
amount of income locally to run their activities is near to impossibility.217
 
 The funding 
restriction forces Ethiopian CSOs to cease operation altogether or drastically downsize 
themselves (reduce staff, offices, budget and activities). Besides, surviving CSOs are 
required to undergo several other changes including name, mandate, membership and 
nationality and work place. The effect of the law is particularly serious on human rights 
NGOs. Some of the changes CSOs were forced to make are illustrated with case studies of 
two CSOs, EHRCO and CRDA, registered in the different forms. 
                                                 
216 Sounding the Horn p. 6. 
217 UPR Submission by Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO) April 2009, para. 7. See also Mahder  
     Paulos, Director of the Ethiopian Women Lawyers’ Association interview with BBC:     
     http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7814145.stm; Yousef Mulugeta, Secretary General of Ethiopian Human    
     Rights Council, interview with the BBC: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7736417.stm 
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One of the CSOs that faced alteration of every proportion is the Ethiopian Human Rights 
Council (EHRCO), a prominent local human rights organization established in 1991 by 
Ethiopians with the objective of promoting human rights, rule of law and democracy.218 
EHRCO has been one of the few independent human rights NGOs that monitors human 
rights situation in the country.219 EHRCO used to get at least 95% of its funds from 
abroad.220 Unsurprisingly, its relation with the government has been rough since its 
formation.221 The government has been considering EHRCO as ‘‘a fox in the skin of a 
ship’’-a political organization in the name of human rights organization, its work 
‘‘politically motivated’’ and unprofessional.222
 
 
To continue as a human rights organization under the CSP regime, EHRCO had to register 
as Ethiopian Charity as other forms do not allow carrying out human rights activities. As a 
result, EHRCO lost at least 95% of its income source and its members (nationals residing 
abroad and foreigners). The lack of income forced EHRCO to close 8 (out of 11) of its 
offices and to lay off large portion (44) of its permanent staff. The fact that it has offices in 
only three regions meant it failed to fulfill the requirement of having offices in five 
regional states to continue with its federal nomenclature or character and hence had to drop 
the prefix ‘‘Ethiopian’’ from its name and become only ‘‘Human Rights Council’’ 
(HRCO).223
 
 Simply, the funding restriction sets a chain of drastic changes.  
In addition, the Agency froze EHRCO’s bank accounts. Director General of the Agency, 
Ato Ali Siraj, justifies the order under Article 14(2 & 5) of the CSP that human rights 
activities should be undertaken by local resources and EHRCO cannot transfer and use the 
funds it secured from abroad before re-registration.224
                                                 
218 EHRCO,     
 Eventually, EHRCO become slim 
and financially insecure, its work undercut and susceptible to incisive and recurrent 
supervisory actions by the Agency.   
     http://www.ehrco.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=section&layout=blog&id=19&Itemid  
     =22&lang=en 
219 Tronvoll (1997) at note 2. See also EHRCO website, Ibid.  
220 McLure (2009). 
221 Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia: Targeting Human Rights Defenders (2001). 
222 Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Curtailed in Ethiopia, December 1997.   
223 The other reason can be resemblance with the government established Ethiopian Human Rights      
     Commission though EHRCO was established much earlier. 
224 Siraj  interview with VOA Amharic service on 24 March 2010.  
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Christian Relief and Development Association (CRDA) is the largest umbrella 
organization in the country with 351 NGO members, both local and international, that used 
to engage in multitude of activities including development, capacity building and rights 
advocacy. To accommodate the interest of its members under the CSP regime, CRDA had 
to register as a Consortium of Ethiopian Residents and Foreign Charities with an amended 
name ‘‘Consortium of Christian Relief and Development Association (CCRDA).225 
Besides ceding its human rights and good governance advocacy objectives and ‘‘change of 
nationality’’ of some of its members (from ‘‘Ethiopian’’ to ‘‘Ethiopian Residents’’ which 
has the same status as foreign CSOs), 60 of its member NGOs were unable to re-
register.226
 
 
In general, the need to secure the much needed foreign fund forced many civil society 
organizations to re-register as Ethiopian residents CSOs or foreign charity thereby 
changing their status as local CSOs and alienating participation in the human rights and 
democratic process of the country. The very few CSOs registered as Ethiopian CSOs 
continue to suffer from lack of funds. 
5.2   Rectification 
Rectification is a process of purging socially or politically unwanted CSOs. It has been 
used in some countries like China since 1989 where large numbers of NGOs were forced 
to cease operation.227Although the CSO law does not specifically provide for such a 
measure, the re-registration and licensing requirements and standards set by the Agency 
effectively served the purpose of rectification. CSOs unable to submit audit reports, 
statement of accounts, and annual activity reports were abolished. CSOs that have not been 
in operation for the last two years or were not doing ‘‘tangible things’’ also ceased 
operation. The process has resulted in the abolishment or deregistration of 60% of CSOs 
that have been registered since 1960s. According to Ato Siraj, only 1527, out of 3800 
CSOs, are registered by 6 February 2010.228
 
 
                                                 
225 See CCRDA Certificate of Registration.       
     http://www.crdaethiopia.org/Documents/Certificate%20CCRDA.pdf 
226 See also Meshesha, President of CRDA interview with VOA Amharic service, 24 March 2009. 
227 Freedom of Association in China and Europe (2005) pp.61-63. 
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Equally menacing is its prospect. Such measure can be taken on any surviving CSO or 
group of CSOs considered ‘‘unwanted’’. It thus institutionalizes harassment on CSOs.  
5.3   Implications on Human Rights Work and the Democratic Process 
Ethiopia seems to have joined the club of electoral authoritarian states where civil society 
and other democratic institutions are successfully controlled or manipulated.229
 
 Ethiopian 
CSP like other countries in the club prohibits democracy assistance particularly to 
independent civil society. The law does this by prohibiting local NGOs funded by foreign 
resources and international NGOs from working in human rights and democracy issues. 
Under Ethiopian context, it means that there will be very few small sized NGOs working in 
these areas due to lack of funds. And international NGOs like HRW and AI will not 
investigate and report on human rights violations in the country. Moreover, the broad 
discretionary power of the Agency creates a climate of fear and uncertainty on CSOs even 
to work on these areas let alone challenge and hold the government accountable. In effect, 
human rights violations will go unreported and uninvestigated, democracy advocacy will 
be off-limits and civil society will surely shift in to non-prohibited or government favoured 
areas like environment, culture, emergency aid, etc.  
As has been experienced elsewhere and early developments suggest government affiliated 
organizations will take charge of these areas. An important illustration is voters’ education 
and election observation where independent CSOs were active during the 2005 election. It 
is clear that foreign and Ethiopian residents CSOs cannot participate in those processes. 
Article 57 of the CSP and developments so far in relation to upcoming May election 
suggest even Ethiopian CSOs are not allowed to participate in democratization and election 
processes. Only mass-based societies seem to be allowed to participate in these areas. So 
far, no independent CSO or coalition participates in voters’ education, arranging debates or 
declares to observe the election. The National Political Parties’ Council arranges 
debates,230
                                                 
229 Lovise and Tronvoll  (2008).  Gershman and Allen (2006) p.37. 
 the role played by an NGO, Inter Africa Group, in the 2005 election. And 
recently a coalition of ten trade union associations is forged and licensed to observe the 
230 Electoral law of Ethiopia Amendment Proclamation No. 532/2007 (Proclamation No. 532/2007 herein  
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2010 election.231 The Coalition has as president the President of Employers Confederation, 
as vice president the President of Employees Confederation and as secretary President of 
Teachers Association. These organizations have long been branded as government 
appendages and the government has been criticized for interference in independent trade 
unions: harassing union leaders and members, dissolving and replacing trade unions with 
government controlled unions, etc.232 Women and youth associations are also flourishing 
under government policy of democratic mass participation and creating a ‘‘vanguard 
force’’.233 The mass-movement ideology emerged in the country following the 1950s and 
60s student movement, hijacked and used to a greater extent by the socialist regime for 
political support, seems to get redemption again in the era of Revolutionary Democracy.234
 
 
Moreover, the 2007 Amended Electoral Law which regulates election observation and 
voters education entrusts the National Election Board the sole responsibility of civic and 
voters’ education with absolute discretion to license or contract organizations to offer civic 
and voters’ education.235
 
 Thus, independent CSOs cannot participate in civic and voters 
education as of right as it is given to the Election Board by a special law. Election 
observation is also subjected to a special regime of licensing by the Board. Newly formed 
CSOs cannot be licensed and only local CSOs can observe elections, if licensed.   
Eventually, human rights activities will be left to government-established institutions: the 
Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and Office of the Ombudsman, both barely have a 
proactive role, independence and capacity to hold the executive organ accountable to the 
constitutional and human rights principles.236
                                                 
231 Fanta (2010). 
 And government sponsored and mass based 
associations will replace independent civil society organizations. The depletion of 
independent civil society organizations is thus a threat to human rights and the 
democratization process in the country.   
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234 Lovise and Tronvoll  (2008) pp.115-16. 
235 Proclamation No. 532/2007art 89(1-3). 
236 See the Report by the Counsel of EPRDF to the 6th EPRDF Congress (September 2006) p. 27. 
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6   Conclusion 
Despite a full liberal constitution that recognizes a range of rights and freedoms, a multi-
party democracy, independent press and other democratic institutions, Ethiopia’s human 
rights and democratic record is at dismal level. The country’s reputation in this regard has 
deteriorated particularly after the 2005 national election where the government, among 
others, embarked on enactment of a series of a new breed of legislations heavily criticized 
for contradicting the Constitution and the country’s commitment under human rights 
instruments. One of such laws that show a reduced commitment to human rights and 
democracy is the Charities and Societies Proclamation. As discussed in the previous 
chapters, the law prescribes stringent establishment and operational requirements for CSOs 
and provides pervasive supervisory powers that contravene the freedom of association and 
other principles. The most serious of such measures are the prohibition of advocacy on 
human rights and democracy by Ethiopian Residents CSOs and Foreign Charities, the 10% 
limit on external funding of Ethiopian CSOs, the requirement of representation from or 
offices in five regional states to form nationwide CSOs, the wide discretionary power of 
the Agency to refuse registration and renewal of license and take any action on CSOs and 
personnel including suspension and dissolution of CSOs and removal and replacement of 
CSOs officers.  
 
Formation, operational and funding limitations in the law curtail the freedom of citizens to 
choice with whom to associate. They cannot associate with foreign resident Ethiopian 
nationals or foreigners that may have the resource and knowledge to promote and protect 
human rights and advocate democracy although promotion and protection of human rights 
and freedoms at national or international level is the right of everyone. It discriminates 
citizens based on status as foreign resident, and discriminatorily prohibits foreign nationals 
to form Societies to protect their rights and interests and advance human rights and 
freedoms.  
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Forming and participating in nationwide CSOs is also unjustly hampered. The prohibition 
of formation of CSOs with federal character or nomenclature unless they have 
representative membership from or work places in five out of nine regions of the country is 
not only unreasonable restriction that contradicts the freedom of association as enshrined in 
the ICCPR and other instruments to which the country is a member, but also threatens the 
legal basis for the Federal Government to regulate other forms of CSOs.  
 
Moreover, the unfettered power of the Agency to refuse registration and renewal of license 
even for minor causes, and to take sweeping action on CSOs or personnel like suspension 
and dissolution of CSOs and strict control of access to funding, removal and replacement 
of CSOs personnel and administration of hefty fines severely impairs the formation, 
operational independence and continued existence of CSOs and hence poses a serious 
threat to freedom of association. Forcing CSOs to cease operation by starving out of 
resources through tight control of foreign as well as local financial sources and extra 
judicial suspension and dissolution of associations for broad, vague and minor grounds 
violate the freedom of association in the gravest of cases.   
 
Under the CSP regime, independent and assertive civil society action would be impossible. 
The Agency has many tools to cripple such CSOs and such measures are not subject to 
judicial review with the exception of ‘‘Ethiopian’’ CSOs. Citizens who receive foreign 
funds or associate with non-residents are denied access to court and right to appeal any 
decision the Agency may take regarding their associations. The existence of such power 
and absence of judicial recourse for remedy creates an environment of fear and uncertainty. 
CSOs that survived the first wave of rectification and transformation that saw the 
dissolution of hundreds of CSOs would be docile at best towards human rights and 
democratic activism in particular as the intolerance of the government is on these areas; 
violations and injustices would go unreported let alone remedied. Government 
organizations like the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and Office of the Ombudsman 
are not intended and equipped to challenge and hold the Government accountable for the 
cause of human rights and justice. Civic participation outside of government sponsored 
mass associations like the women and youth associations and trade unions would be 
peripheral, or at best would shift to insensitive and government favoured areas like 
emergency relief. In effect, CSOs will be confined to addressing the effects of societal 
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problems and poverty instead of addressing the causes of deprivations. Respect for human 
rights and democratization in the country in the absence of independent civil society is thus 
bleak. 
 
To sum, the Ethiopian state has failed to fulfill its obligation under international human 
rights instruments and the Constitution to respect, protect and fulfill the freedom of 
association and other basic freedoms by specifying deeply intrusive measures in the 
Charities and Societies law. Hence, the restrictive provisions of the CSP that violates the 
Constitutional and international human rights principles need to be revised, to the 
minimum.  
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